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U.S. covert interventions in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Cuba (1961) 
represent one path dependent event sequence whereby institutions adopted pathological 
characteristics that carried the U.S. national security apparatus into the failed invasion of 
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Likewise, the U.S. overt intervention in Iraq (2003) represents a 
similar institutionally driven event sequence that carried the United States to war with 
Iraq under dubious justification. Through analyzing systemic factors that influenced 
policy formulation prior to and during the Eisenhower and Bush administrations, I argue 
that sufficient evidence exists to suggest that institutions developed based largely on 
ideologically driven threat perceptions of communism and terrorism negatively 
influenced policy formulation and contributed to undesirable outcomes in both event 
chains. 
Agency driven shifts in national security institutions to achieve ideologically 
based objectives during each administration drove U.S. foreign policy outside of 
previously institutionalized procedures by seizing upon opportunity structures created 
during periods of national fear stemming from salient political environments plagued 
with excessive communist and terrorist threat perceptions and rhetoric. Understanding 
how institutional path dependent factors converged in each of these cases may shed light 
on how to prevent such foreign policy missteps in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Theodore Draper referred to the Bay of Pigs invasion as, “the perfect failure,” and 
President John F. Kennedy called the disaster, “the worst experience of my life.”1 In 
1961, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organized a brigade of Cuban dissidents to 
infiltrate and overthrow Fidel Castro on the island of Cuba. The landing was a tactical 
failure due in large part to Castro’s having expected that the United States would 
intervene and thus having already taken steps to consolidate control of the armed forces 
prior to the covert action. The tactical failures and constraints placed on U.S. military 
support to the Cuban brigade are not the only causal mechanisms that led to the failure. 
From analysis of the U.S. interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 
1961, a pattern emerges that suggests that institutions took on path dependent 
characteristics and created instances of behavioural lock-in among relevant actors within 
U.S. national security institutions responsible for the development and execution of U.S. 
policies during the Cold War.2 In this thesis, I argue that the perception of successful 
U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala played a significant role in the failure at the Bay 
of Pigs, and contributed to the development of an institutional pathology that provided 
motivations in policy formation that led to an overall escalation of tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Through identifying the factors that explain 
the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 from the perspective of historical 
institutionalism, I argue that a path dependent sequence emerged, and directly contributed 
to the failed invasion. The failed invasion is significant because it had far-reaching 
impacts beyond the tactical failure of the operation. U.S. intervention in Iran in 1953, 
Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 1961, sought regime change that would allow the United 
States to further its Cold War objectives to contain and, where possible, roll back the 
proliferation of communist institutions. The repercussions of the failed invasion 
                                                 
1 Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (New 
York: The New Press, 1998), 2, 3. 
2 William Barnes, Myles Gartland, and Martin Stack, “Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and 
Behavioral Lock-in,” in Journal of Economic Issues 38, no. 2 (2004): 372. 
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contributed significantly to escalations of U.S.-Soviet tensions during the Cold War, and 
fueled grievances of class division within Latin America. In my conclusion, I argue that 
contemporary implications of similar path dependent sequences created by institutions 
drove the United States into its 2003 invasion of Iraq under circumstances of dubious 
justification. 
Understanding path determinacies within institutional behaviour is an emerging 
field of research that offers institutions the opportunity to understand hazards associated 
with the development of means and ways to reach desired ends when those policies 
themselves constrain actors along paths that prevent achievement of the sought after 
ends. This is particularly significant in national security affairs because the institutions 
responsible for executing national security strategy are typically shrouded from 
immediate external criticism and disinterested oversight that less sensitive institutions 
receive from more open debate and dialogue. Perhaps even more significant is the power 
of institutional constructs to drive events even when that open debate and dialogue exists 
but is subverted to achieve institutional pretexts, as shown in the case of the Iraq war 
justification. While much scholarship exists on the failure of the Bay of Pigs, and the 
conclusion that the failure was influenced by the preceding operations in Iran and 
Guatemala, it seems that little research has directly attempted to identify the causal 
process that led to the failure. By using pre-existing theory on path dependence 
phenomena tested against this event sequence, I determined that an institutional 
pathology developed that potentially could have been identified and possibly prevented 
the subsequent chain of events that ultimately led to the failed invasion.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The use of path dependence to describe institutional phenomena typically traces 
its origin to economic scholarship highlighting an example that demonstrates consumer 
preference for a less-efficient keyboard layout that defeated a more efficient design, 
counteracting what market theory suggests as the ideal outcome. The less efficient 
QWERTY keyboard layout triumphing over the more efficient DVORAK layout, and 
similarly the adoption of VHS cassettes over the allegedly superior VCR format, 
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represent functions of historical circumstances rather than predicted market selected 
efficiencies in traditional economic theory.3 In other words, even though the DVORAK 
keyboard layout offered a more efficient typing solution, the QWERTY keyboard’s early 
proliferation made adoption of the DVORAK keyboard unappealing. Path dependency 
finds much of its origin in this type of economic scholarship, which often argues the 
phenomena of “increasing returns” as contributing to a deterministic path of events that 
may not be optimal, yet persevere nonetheless due to the perceived costs of breaking 
from the established sequence.  
This theory applies in the field of historical institutionalism as well. James 
Mahoney concludes, “path dependence occurs when a contingent historical event triggers 
a subsequent sequence that follows a relatively deterministic pattern.”4 Mahoney argues 
that two types of path dependent sequences exist. Self-reinforcing sequences that initiate 
when a “contingent period corresponds with the initial adoption of a particular intuitional 
arrangement” and continues with a deterministic pattern that results in the institution’s 
reproduction over time.5 In reactive sequences, a breakpoint in history known as a critical 
juncture corresponds with the contingent period leading to a deterministic pattern of 
reactions logically following from the breakpoint.6 Like the QWERTY keyboard layout 
and the VHS format, Mahoney argues, for example, that the “development of the steam 
engine was a contingent breakpoint that led England to diverge sharply from other 
countries with similar preconditions for industrialism.”7 Paul Pierson elaborates on the 
notion of increasing returns within path dependence theory, arguing that the 
“investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for 
developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism.”8 
                                                 
3 Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, “Old Habits,” 371. 




7 Ibid., 536. 
8 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251. 
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Pierson describes the increasing returns process as “the probability of further steps along 
the same path [increasing] with each move down that path” because “the relative benefits 
of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time.”9 Pierson 
asserts that this is Mahoney’s self-reinforcing, or positive feedback process.10 
Pierson builds further on Mahoney’s argument that “when certain actors are in a 
position to impose rules on others, the employment of power may be self-reinforcing,” 
and that “actors may use political authority to generate changes in the rules of the game 
(both formal institutions and various public policies) designed to enhance their power.”11 
The institutional significance of this path dependency, as Pierson points out, is that “once 
established, basic outlooks on politics, ranging from ideologies to understandings of 
particular aspects of governments or orientations toward political groups or parties, are 
generally tenacious.”12 Pierson also notes that time horizons in political path dependence 
differ from economic path dependence because of the potential for short-term pay-off 
seeking politicians who set in motion a particular path that provides “powerful incentives 
to stay on it.”13 Pierson also argues that unlike the economic realm’s dynamic ability to 
change, the political realm, with its “public policies and formal institutions,” is typically 
“change-resistant,” and therefore more likely to be bound on a particular path.”14 He also 
concludes that inertia, driven by positive feedback signaling, often may lead to a change-
resistant “single equilibrium” state within the institution.15 Despite this challenge, 
Pierson argues, “the claims in path dependent arguments are that previously viable 
options may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and 
cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult and will 
condition the form in which new branchings will occur.”16 The investigation of the 
                                                 
9 Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 252. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 259. 
12 Ibid., 260. 
13 Ibid., 262. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 263. 
16 Ibid., 265. 
5increasing returns process is “historical because it recognizes that political development 
must be understood as a process that unfolds over time,” and that “it is institutionalist 
because it stresses that many of the contemporary political implications of these temporal 
processes are embedded in institutions—whether formal rules, policy structures, or 
norms.”17 The challenge of path dependent analysis, as Pierson argues, lies in the 
difficulty of evaluating sequences of several variables over time, the “many variables, 
few cases” problem.18 
Barnes, Gartland, and Stack further build upon path dependency and identify 
circumstances they refer to as behavioral lock-in, which they describe as occurring “when 
the behavior of the agent (consumer or producer) is ‘stuck’ in some sort of inefficiency or 
sub-optimality due to habit, organizational learning, or culture.”19 The authors elaborate 
on this concept, stating that “once a product has become established as an industry 
standard, and once consumers or users have invested time or money in learning a 
particular system or become comfortable with a traditional practice, they will be less 
likely to try a rival process, even if over time it proves superior.”20 These authors do not 
propose a completely new field of path dependency, but build upon traditional 
technology oriented examples—the keyboard layout—found in economic studies by also 
including “lock-ins emanating from ‘learning and habituation’ of agents within 
institutions” as part of the theory.21 
Kurt Weyland attempts to further expand upon path dependency by applying 
cognitive psychological findings regarding bounded rationality into the practical 
applicability of institutional change.22 Weyland argues that political institutions are 
“imbued with special legitimacy and depicted as reflections of long-standing cultural and 
historical traditions,” which leads historical institutionalism to predict that these countries 
17 Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 265. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Barnes, Gartland, and Stack, “Old Habits,” 372. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 376. 
22 Kurt Weyland, “Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change,” World Politics 60, no. 2 (2008): 
284. 
6will “follow their established regime trajectory.”23 Due to the “political and personal 
risks” associated with regime change, Weyland points out that within these types of 
institutions, changes are typically wrought through violence and that “institutional inertia, 
deep-seated cultural values, and historical traditions” tend to propel countries along 
“long-standing political trajectories.”24  
Thomas Bruneau utilizes New Institutionalism to analyze civil-military 
relations in defense contracting in Patriots for Profit. He highlights the work of 
Claus Offe’s study, “Political Institutions and Social Power,” who identified five 
functions of institutions: (1) the formative impact on actors, (2) the congruent preference 
formation, (3) economizing on transaction costs, (4) frictionless self-coordination, and 
(5) continuity.25 The final function of continuity implies that successful institutions 
become more powerful and self-perpetuating over time because they naturally breed 
conservatism, stifle innovation, resist change, and tend toward path dependence.26 New 
Institutionalism defines institutions as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy.”27 The theory concludes that institutions originate from the “goals and 
motivation of the actors who create them,” and that the “process of creating and 
implementing institutions is all about power.”28 Institutions represent the rules that 
structure how actors behave, but are themselves manipulated to benefit the actors who 
create them, for better or for worse. 
In The Origins of the National Security State, Athan Theoharis traces just such 
institutional competition for power within the post-World War II U.S. intelligence 
community that led to the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, and the creation of the 
23 Weyland, “Toward,” 306.
24 Weyland, “Toward,” 306. 
25 Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security 
(Stanford: University Press, 2011), 8–9. 
26 Ibid., 8–9. 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Ibid. 
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Centralized Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC).29 Later, 
in February 1956, and in response to the Clark Task Force’s report that the CIA lacked 
appropriate congressional oversight, the Senate voted 59 to 27 against a resolution to 
create a ten-member joint congressional committee to oversee the CIA.30 The argument 
against that proposal came from one senator who stated, “If there is one agency of 
government which we must take some matters of faith on, without a constant examination 
of its methods and sources, I believe that agency is the CIA.”31 In the absence of 
oversight and accountability, the potential for undesirable trajectories to continue to the 
point of unintended outcomes arguably increased significantly during the agency’s 
formative years. 
Defining success in the types of interventions that occurred in Iran, Guatemala, 
and Cuba is somewhat ambiguous, but conditions that lead to a tactically successful 
intervention are easier to define than their long-term implications. According to Steven R. 
David, the preconditions that led to success in close to half of the 200 coups executed 
between the end of World War II and the early 1980s were: (1) regimes lacking popular 
legitimacy; (2) society lacking a popular sense of community; (3) low citizen 
participation in governance; and (4) a concentrated, and thus vulnerable, elite political 
class.32 David also argues that the U.S. should maintain a counter-coup policy to promote 
stability, primarily for the sake of the critical element of speed required to successfully 
execute such operations.33 Drawing upon examples in Gabon in 1964, the Sudan in 1971, 
Laos in 1973, and Gambia in 1981, David formulates certain criteria to define success in 
these operations in the future, but the author concedes that each coup is unique and must 
                                                 
29 Athan Theoharis, The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence 
Agencies (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 110–113. 
30 Theoharis, Quest, 134–35. 
31 Ibid., 135. 




be weighed in its own right.34 For that reason, a deeper historical analysis of the 
circumstances in Cuba leading up to the failure at the Bay of Pigs is warranted. 
Analysis of Edward Luttwak’s, a Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook, offers an 
explanation of the historically understood pre-coup conditions. Luttwak draws a 
distinction between a “Palace Revolution” and a coup as a matter of state 
bureaucratization, the former being an overthrow of a personalized leader that must be 
accomplished by insiders, and the latter differing in that it may be carried out external of 
the government bureaucratic apparatus but inside the state.35  
The criteria dictating intervention may be more important in understanding the 
long-term eventual outcome, as well as potential for tactical success, than the 
peculiarities of the orchestration of the intervention. Mark J. Mullenbach and Gerard P. 
Matthews compiled an extensive analysis of both international and domestic factors that 
led to U.S. intervention, identifying that political ideologies, economic stress, presidential 
popularity and political success, electoral cycles, and Congressional support to the 
Executive all play domestic roles in influencing the decision to intervene in another 
nation’s internal politics.36 Likewise, the antithesis of domestic variables argues that 
statistical analysis fails to correlate these domestic factors as influential in U.S. 
intervention policies.37 Mullenbach and Matthews conclude that what actually drives 
U.S. decisions to intervene are a combination of international factors, and that the 
majority of these historical interventions were driven by Cold War competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in a nuclear constrained environment.38 This 
structural argument supports institutionally driven outcomes since institutions are created 
to confront systemic challenges within the international environment, and further helps to 
illuminate motivations behind the choices of individual actors based on how they 
                                                 
34 David, “Coup and Anti-Coup,” 198, 200–201. 
35 Edward Luttwak, Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook (Cambridge: Penguin Press, 1968), 20. 
36 Mark J. Mullenbach and Gerard P. Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International 
and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes,” International Interactions 
34, no. 1 (2008): 28–29. doi: 10.1080/03050620701878835. 
37 Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene,” 28–29.  
38 Ibid. 
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perceive themselves as part of that system, and how they perceive their respective 
institutional constraints. 
Controlling the perception of legitimacy in regime change operations also appears 
to be a critical factor in determining the tactical and strategic success of such 
interventions. In Iran and Guatemala, the CIA was able to assist the opposition groups in 
manipulating this perception more effectively than in Cuba, through organizing protests 
in Iran, and the use of propaganda radio broadcasts that were particularly successful in 
Guatemala. One of the principal lessons from the failure at the Bay of Pigs was the 
danger that the incongruence of U.S. foreign policy, which aimed at maintaining the 
United States’ moral and political standing, and an intervention that would be perceived 
as a grossly illegitimate act of aggression against a smaller state.39 Of course, the risk 
associated with conducting operations outside of the realm of legitimacy lies in the 
damage to national credibility their attribution will create for the intervener. In Kermit 
Roosevelt’s account of the operation in Iran, he concluded that public and military 
support for the Shah, when challenged by what they had been made to believe were the 
Soviet-backed puppets—Mosaddegh and the Tudeh party—public perception regarding 
legitimacy fell overwhelmingly with their king.40 Had the preconditions for that kind of 
sentiment not existed, Kermit Roosevelt argues that the operation would not have been 
likely to succeed.41 
In the case of Iran, a considerable amount of literature exists arguing the origins 
of U.S. intervention and the implications U.S.-Iranian relations. The most common 
argument describes the strategic British and American oil interests in Iran, and suggests 
that the Iranians themselves had little say in the events that placed the Shah back into 
power. Yet Fariborz Mokhtari points out that there is considerable evidence that the 
uprising against Mosaddegh was, in fact, “a popular reaction to the failed coup,” 
considering the actual coup to have been orchestrated initially by Mosaddegh himself 
                                                 
39 Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene,” 14. 
40 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 210.  
41 Ibid., 210. 
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against the Shah.42 The author argues that shifting political dynamics within the country 
had aligned against the prime minister even before the actual uprisings and protests 
arranged by the CIA. This coincides with Kermit Roosevelts’ conclusion that, in the case 
of Iran, the success of operation AJAX lay in the correctness of the CIA assessment of 
the situation in Iran, and not in the intrinsic functionality of the methods of the operation 
itself.43 Rouhollah Ramazani, provides an excellent summary regarding the political 
environment in the post-World War II years and the nationalist movement, led primarily 
by Mosaddegh on the demand of oil nationalization. He also describes the circumstances 
of the Iran crisis of 1945 to 1946 regarding withdrawal of occupying Soviet troops, the 
Shah’s increasing attempts at forming an alliance with the United States, and the political 
divisions created within Iran between Shah loyalists and the nationalist movement.44 
U.S. intervention in Guatemala occurred the following year in 1954, and in his 
book, Countercoup, Kermit Roosevelt suggests that he was offered the job to lead the 
operation in Guatemala; however, he doubted that the political circumstances were 
favorable to an undertaking similar to Iran.45 Much of the debate around the Guatemalan 
operation named PBSUCCESS focuses on the link between the United Fruit Company 
and John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles, director of 
the CIA. Nick Cullather wrote a narrative history of the Guatemalan operation for the 
CIA in 1992, and concluded that Washington officials were consumed with seeing the 
world as a “global pattern of Communist activity,” and in the case of Guatemala, failed to 
consider the internal political reform movements that were happening in the country.46 
Despite Cullather’s conclusion that Washington officials were unaware of the 
circumstances unfolding in Guatemala, James Siekmeier argues that Washington was 
                                                 
42 Fariborz Mokhtari, “Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics Versus External Intrigue,” 
Middle East Journal 62, no. 3 (2008): 486. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482541. 
43 Roosevelt, Countercoup, 210.  
44 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence (New York: 
Praeger, 1982), 10–11. 
45 Roosevelt, Countercoup, 210. 
46 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 
1952–1954 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 9. 
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well aware of the growing trend of economic nationalism.47 Siekmeier also argues that 
Washington saw growth in Latin America as the imperative, and that the growing 
sentiment of nationalism in the region was a potential economic threat U.S. interests in 
the region.48 Deborah Yashar argues that the 1944 revolution that brought democratic 
rule to Guatemala was already under threat from a growing conservative movement 
within the country that would have eventually overthrown Arbenz, and she concluded 
that the external intervention might have been unnecessary.49 John Coatsworth, on the 
other hand, questions if this would have been possible without U.S. intervention acting as 
a catalyst for conservative counteraction against leftist reforms.50 Frederick W. Marks 
argues that much of the literature on Guatemala and operation PBSUCCESS victimizes 
Arbenz and his supporters, and fails to emphasize the suspicious connections of the 
assassins of Arbenz’s political opponent, Colonel Francisco Javier Arana, who had been 
expected to win the presidency.51 Marks also draws attention to the nature of Arbenz’s 
land reforms as a form of popular patronage: land was given in exchange for political 
support, and the author also highlights the number of known communists within Arbenz’s 
administration as having been a significant threat to Guatemala’s stability.52 The 
arguments span the levels of analysis: personal, domestic, and international factors drove 
the process. 
In the case of Cuba, the communist threat dominates much of the debate. Peter 
Kornbluh’s compilation of declassified documents, however, suggests that both Castro 
and the level of popular support he possessed in Cuba were greatly underestimated by 
                                                 
47 James F. Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the 
United States 1945–1961 (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 160–61. 
48 Siekmeier, Aid, 162. 
49 Deborah J. Yashar, Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala 




50 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in 
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Washington initially. Kornbluh highlights the connection of operation PBSUCCESS in 
Guatemala to the failure at the Bay of Pigs.53 LeoGrande and Kornbluh conclude that, 
despite Washington’s initial period of acceptance toward the Cuban Revolution, the 
Eisenhower administration could not reconcile its distrust of Castro and what threat he 
would pose for U.S. interests on the island.54 The Lyman Kirkpatrick official 
investigation into the failure at the Bay of Pigs invasion concluded that tactical errors 
with the mission and the overall assessment of the political situation within Cuba were 
primarily responsible for the failure.55 On the contrary, Richard Bissell, the head of the 
operation, concluded that the lack of political will to see the operation through due to the 
unsavory means required to do so was the proximate cause of the failure.56 
The nationalist sentiment that the Iran operation seems to have exploited so well, 
also seems to have been overlooked, or ignored, in both the Guatemala and Cuba 
operations. A wave of economic nationalism existed in the developing world after the 
conclusion of World War II. Particularly in the Western Hemisphere, this form of 
nationalism challenged the standing inter-American economic system and led to Latin 
American reformists’ seeking to reduce economic interdependence with the United 
States.57 The Iranian operation demonstrated to the Eisenhower administration that it had 
a proven covert instrument of coercive national power that could exert U.S. will on 
nations short of armed confrontation, and preferably in a plausibly deniable manner if 
things did not go as planned. Both the Guatemala and Cuba operations are uniquely tied 
to one another, not only because they both occurred in Latin America, but also because 
many of the same individual actors were intimately involved with the planning and 
execution of those operations. Members of the CIA attribute at least a fair share of the 
Guatemala operation’s success to mere luck, combined with incompetence on the part of 
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Arbenz’s administration to maintain government control, but concede that the 
psychological victory of the operation actually allowed the overthrow to succeed.58  
The perception of legitimacy produced by the psychological operations of the 
Guatemalan intervention managed to turn failure into a success, but the series of events 
that followed the overthrow’s tactical success eventually took Guatemala into a 30-year 
calamity of internal violence and repression, drastically increased the financial burden of 
U.S. aid, and wreaked havoc on the Guatemalan economy. Nonetheless, in after action 
briefings, the operation was hailed as a resounding success for the national security 
apparatus underneath the Eisenhower administration.59 It certainly legitimized the 
potential to use proxy paramilitary forces as a solution for regime change for the 
Eisenhower administration’s national security institution, and was influential in shaping 
the plan for the Cuban intervention that resulted in failure. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The systemic factors which explain the emergence of the institutional pathology 
that contributed to the Bay of Pigs failure—beyond the tactical failures of the invasion 
itself—were three fold. First, U.S. policymakers blurred communist subversion with 
economic nationalist movements in the decolonizing Third World. Second, U.S. threat 
perceptions increased when Third World leaders attached communist labels to domestic 
opposition groups creating salient domestic political rhetoric—both in the United States 
and Third World nations—which helped drive interventionist policies, but also 
emboldened U.S. adversaries. These factors combined with the perception of successful 
intervention in Iran and Guatemala to create a self-reinforcing deterministic chain that 
helped carry the incoming Kennedy administration into the failure in Cuba. A pattern of 
increasing returns emerged from the perception of success, which led to a condition of 
institutional behavioral lock-in—driven largely by confirmation bias—that contributed to 
the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.60 In other words, the Guatemalan 
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operation, which later came to be characterized as a textbook example of how not to 
orchestrate a covert operation, succeeded mostly by chance, and was then adopted as a 
tried means of accomplishing foreign policy objectives. Washington officials, while able 
to correctly identify nationalist reform-oriented movements and often able to distinguish 
them from communist insurrections, were constrained by Cold War policies and attitudes 
toward the Soviet Union, which combined with the political salience of the threat of 
communist subversion at home. In the Cuban case, early U.S. policies reacting to the 
Cuban Revolution and actions taken prior to the invasion had the ironic effect of pushing 
the Cubans into alignment with the Soviet Union, actually strengthening Castro’s position 
and increasing the improbability of success for the operation. Identifying and linking the 
historical evidence that supports this hypothesis of institutional path dependence during 
the Eisenhower administration provides additional explanations of the failed invasion at 
the Bay of Pigs beyond the tactical failures that occurred during the landing operations, 
and the decision not to provide more air support to the brigade of Cuban dissidents. 
The case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 differs due to the fact that it was an 
overt military operation, as opposed to the covert methods of regime change in the 
preceding three cases. Yet, at the institutional level, the factors that created the path 
determinate event chain that carried the United States into Iraq differs little from the path 
that carried the United States into the failure at the Bay of Pigs. In both cases, a similar 
confirmation bias emerged that resulted in behavioral lock-in among the relevant actors, 
and determined the course that the nation would take.61 The key difference in the Iraq 
case is that the Bush administration systematically created the structure for the 
confirmation bias that seems to have developed more in the absence of competing view 
points within secret planning cells under the Eisenhower administration. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennet argue that in a case comparison study, 
standardizing data requirements is critical to a successful single or comparative case 
study, and by asking the same questions within each case, the “results can be compared, 
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cumulated, and systematically analyzed.”62 This thesis draws upon the historical 
institutional approach of path dependence, initially to test the theory of path dependence 
against a single expanded case, and then to apply that theory to a second comparative 
case to determine if the same phenomenon of path dependence existed. Analysis of the 
extended case of regime change interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, which span 
the Eisenhower administration into the early years of the Kennedy administration, 
provides a concrete example of what James Mahoney referred to as a self-reinforcing 
sequence of path dependency. Tracing the contributing factors of the failed invasion at 
the Bay of Pigs by connecting the institutional perceptions of success—the increasing 
returns—in the Iran and Guatemala interventions, highlights the significant causal factors 
that contributed to the development of an institutional pathology within the U.S. national 
security apparatus of the period. During my investigation of these three events, I find a 
pattern in the apparent decision-making applied to each of these cases that is indicative of 
path-dependent institutional behavioral lock-ins described by Barnes, Gartland, and 
Stack.63  
The period of investigation for the expanded case study centers on the Eisenhower 
administration, but also addresses factors that occurred immediately before and after the 
period, into the first part of the Kennedy administration. The intent is to identify the 
contingent events and critical junctures that set in motion the chain sequence leading to 
the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs, with the understanding that the failure itself likely 
represents a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin America relations during the second half of the 
20th century. Once these junctures are identified, they build a strong case for my 
hypothesis that the Iran and Guatemala interventions are part of that chain sequence. 
During my initial investigation of material, I found that other interventions might also be 
worth addressing, but believe these three to be the most significant, and material rich, 
sources for the study. There is considerable literature on each of these interventions, and 
in addition to a number of secondary sources, I reviewed primary source documents 
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available in the Foreign Relations of the United States collection, and declassified 
documents available within the National Security Archive collection. 
I also incorporated Weyland’s empirically grounded theory of institutional 
change, which focuses on human judgment and choice, as opposed to simply rational 
choice, based on his argument that “human rationality is distinctly bounded.”64 Weyland 
argues that the “insufficiency of adaptation [change] over time increases the problem load 
on the existing institutional framework,” and that when change does occur it is generally 
in bursts that “set in motion waves of contagion” that have thus far rarely been analyzed 
by historical institutionalists.65 The goal was to make my findings more broadly 
compelling as a useful case study for the construction and adaptation of institutions based 
on the challenges of path dependency by positing the potential for actors to intervene if 
such paths can be understood to develop within our institutions. 
Finally, I found that the institutional patterns leading up to the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq are compellingly similar to the institutional pathology leading up to the Bay of Pigs 
invasion to include this as a secondary case that links the problem of path dependence 
within institutional challenges in national security affairs. This approach gave what John 
Gerring referred to as a diachronic linkage through time and provided the experimental 
opportunity to test my hypothesis regarding the Bay of Pigs case against the Iraq case.66 
Though the Iraq case represents an overt, rather than covert, intervention, the U.S. 
national security institution as a whole was explicitly involved in justifying the action, 
and the pattern of institutional behavioral lock-in appears quite similar to the Bay of Pigs 
case. Furthermore, the U.S. compulsion to justify the Iraq invasion internationally is an 
outcome of Latin American attempts at “soft balancing” of U.S. power, which in many 
ways appears as blowback from Cold War policies in Latin America.67 George and 
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Bennet argue that “process-tracing” can be useful when comparing similar cases and that 
identifying the conditions created by a particular policy, or in this case the pattern of 
institutionally provoked behavior, leads to a similar outcome and therefore explains the 
causal role of a “particular independent variable across all cases.”68 While this thesis is 
limited to two cases, it may provide the framework for further investigations of 
institutional path dependency in other cases.  
E. ROADMAP 
The thesis is divided into five sections, beginning with the description and 
definition of the concepts of path dependency theory as they apply to this thesis. Analysis 
of the of the interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Cuba in 1961, as they 
contributed toward a self-reinforcing chain sequence within the U.S. national security 
institution that ultimately led to the failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 follows. The critical 
junctures, perceptions of increasing returns and institutional behavioral lock-ins that 
contributed to the failed invasion demonstrate the inherent dangers that institutions face 
when they unwittingly adopt these dependent paths. Examination of the implications that 
these institutional hazards had on the security of the United States as an immediate 
outcome of this chain sequence illuminates the significance of such institutional 
pathologies and their long term implications. The thesis starts with the formulation of 
Cold War policies and the 1953 and 1954 U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala to set 
the foundation for the problems of the 1961 invasion of the Bay of Pigs, and then 
concludes by analyzing similar problems that arose during the buildup and justification 
for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the concluding chapter. 
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II. U.S. COLD WAR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1953 
INTERVENTION IN IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The development of U.S. policy during the early years of the Cold War set in 
motion the chain of events that would follow and ultimately lead to the failed intervention 
in Cuba. The policies formulated during the period of fear and uncertainty that followed 
the conclusion of World War II were a product of the extent of the war itself. The vast 
institutions and bureaucracies created to fight the war militarized the international system 
in a way the world had not yet seen. The dawn of the nuclear age and its subsequent 
proliferation to the Soviet Union changed the nature of the globe’s geopolitical 
battlefield. Once the Soviet Union acquired the bomb, it further reinforced the need for 
mobilization of new elements of national power to confront that threat. The creation of 
institutions to prevent a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, which would have 
been devastatingly costly for both sides, pushed policymakers on both sides to create 
institutions that could reduce the chance of a full scale confrontation, yet still provide 
coercive force in the form of covert interventions.  
In this chapter, I argue that the development of U.S. Cold War policies that began 
in Iran, carried over into the Western Hemisphere after those means were vindicated in 
the 1953 operation to place the Shah of Iran back into power. The operation’s success 
marked a critical juncture in the path that led to the failed intervention in Cuba as it 
provided early confirmation of the feasibility of regime change and the creation of puppet 
states that could contain the spread of communism, and perceivably roll it back. 
Hindsight, however, has provided evidence that the unique conditions in Iran at the time 
allowed for the operation’s success more so than the means used to conduct these types 
of operations. Nonetheless, the technique became an instrument of policy to fight the 
Cold War and project power in a nuclear constrained geopolitical environment, while 
simultaneously countering economic nationalist movements and preventing the spread of 
communism. 
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B. POST–WORLD WAR II RECONSTRUCTION AND IRAN 
At the close of World War II, Barry Rubin argues that Iran found itself caught 
between the machinations of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and looked to 
the United States to provide some degree of mediation to ensure Iranian sovereignty.69 
Rubin argues that the United States, eager to take on its new role as an international 
power, sought to broker a balance of power between British and Soviet interests within 
Iran, and “Iran became a testing ground for the containment policy and a key experience 
in persuading Americans of Soviet bad faith.”70 At issue were Soviet desires for a “buffer 
zone” in northern Iran and aspirations for “direct access to the Persian Gulf,” which 
would provide a long-sought-after warm water port for the Soviet navy.71 The signaling 
of Soviet intentions came quickly after the conclusion of World War II, when American 
and British occupying troops agreed to be out of Iran by January and March 1946, while 
the Soviets refused to set a withdrawal date.72 The Soviets had also “established a 
Kurdish puppet state alongside their Azerbaijan satellite,” and used propaganda radio 
broadcasts to incite discord among the masses in the Iranian regions of Gilan and 
Mazandiron, as well as inside Tehran.73 Rubin argues that while these threats worried 
officials in Washington, Stalin’s speeches regarding communism’s incompatibility with 
capitalism and George Kennan’s predictions regarding Soviet expansion, came to 
coincide with both Iranian domestic political maneuvering that called for U.S. support 
and U.S. domestic political allegations that the Truman administration was appeasing 
Stalin.74 The Iranians began carefully maneuvering within opportunity spaces created by 
competing Soviet, British, and American interests in the region, and the United States had 
an opportunity to test a new means to counter Soviet aggression, and quiet economic 
nationalism in the Third World. 
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The Iranian Prime Minister Qavam es-Sultanah used “Iran’s American card” in an 
effort to pressure the Soviet Union to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran.75 Understanding 
the international pressure placed on the Soviet Union, Rubin argues that Qavam was able 
to demand of Stalin that any Soviet oil concessions would have to be ratified through 
elections of new Majlis (Iranian Parliament), and that those elections would be incumbent 
on a Soviet withdrawal from Iran.76 The Soviet withdrawal permitted those concessions 
and gave rise to the Tudeh Party, as Iranians began to see the Soviets as “the wave of 
Iran’s future.”77 Qavam managed to settle a revolt by the southern tribes of Iran, who 
“hated the Shah’s authority but feared the Tudeh even more,” by gaining their electoral 
support.78 This gave way to pro-Soviet Iranian officials passing on internal details 
regarding Iranian politics to the Soviet Union, which Qavam used as leverage to curry 
favor from the U.S. ambassador.79 Both the U.S. Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff concluded that Soviet interests in Iran represented a U.S. national security threat 
in the form of Soviet access to oil and as a “defensive position to protect United States-
controlled oil wells in Saudi Arabia.”80 The result was broad based financial and military 
support to Qavam’s government that allowed the Iranian army to march into Azerbaijan 
and Kurdistan and overthrow the Soviet backed regimes.81 Rubin highlights that these 
victories by Iran’s prime minister placed U.S. desire for Iranian democratization in a 
paradoxical position, since Qavam’s success had actually strengthened popular support 
for the Shah.82 
Rubin describes Iran’s political and economic situation as “chaotic,” and that the 
supporters that the Shah had gained would just as quickly turn on him if their own 
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interests came to be threatened through reform efforts.83 The Iranians wanted a huge 
stimulus package from the United States, mostly in the form of tanks, jet planes, and an 
enlarged army, which the United States feared would only exacerbate Soviet-Iranian 
tensions.84 The United States preferred a more subtle aid package that would help Iran 
focus on internal security issues and domestic reform.85 Rubin argues that domestic 
reform was complicated by the fact that the Majlis were “controlled by Iran’s traditional 
landlord elite,” who were “hesitant to act on any social reforms.”86 The degree of 
domestic division within Iran during the period is highlighted by the 1949 assassination 
attempt on the Shah. The attacker was connected to the Tudeh Party and Islamic-
fundamentalist groups, but the Shah also faced opposition from the Fedayeen-i-Islam 
terrorist organization, the Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al Qasim Kashani, other devout Muslims 
who felt the Shah’s “modernization program had gone too far” and, of course, the 
communists themselves, whose power base had declined considerably.87 
After the assassination attempt, the Shah moved to consolidate his power in a 
series of crackdowns, including outlawing the Tudeh Party. Rubin points out that this 
coincided with an intensification of anti-Iranian Soviet propaganda, which charged that 
Iran had become “a United States military base,” and border clashes between Soviet and 
Iranian forces increased.88 A coinciding crop failure also took Iran into an economic 
depression, which led to more calls for U.S. assistance. As Rubin points out, U.S. foreign 
aid was a relatively “new and somewhat suspect program for Congress,” and already 
spending heavily on the reconstruction of Western Europe meant that much of those calls 
for aid went unanswered.89 This spurred the Shah’s first visit to the United States, as he 
sought consulting for bank loans to stimulate the economy, but the visit had another 
effect on the American people. Rubin points out that the U.S. press received the Shah as 
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“not only a progressive ruler but also the head of a friendly nation which provided the 
lifeline of the grand alliance during the war and which has now become one of the 
principal bulwarks against Soviet imperialist expansion.”90 This contrasted starkly with 
Washington’s assessment of the Shah. Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw him as “a 
very impractical young man . . . full of grandiose ideas” who “fancied himself as a great 
military leader,” and that his economic ambitions for Iran’s modernization were simply 
outside the realm of Iran’s capacity.91 Acheson concluded that the Shah’s obsession with 
military spending to counter the Soviets would ultimately bankrupt the country and that a 
better course of action would be to pursue “free economic and social structures that the 
Russians would be deterred from attacking.”92 The division between U.S. and Iranian 
developmental goals meant that U.S. aid for Iran would not be forthcoming, which 
intentionally forced Iran to look to its oil reserves for state revenue. 
The British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the Iranian government had 
already been negotiating for a “more favorable petroleum revenue contract” in light of 
the government’s financial needs, and as Rubin points out, “Iranian resentment toward 
AIOC operations had been growing for decades.”93 In the early 1950s, this resentment 
stemmed from the fact that the “British government and English stockholders had 
received three times as much from company profits as did the Iranian government.”94 
Rubin argues that the AIOC’s size and political power within Iran involved it in “a play 
of social forces” within Iran, and that the company was involved in “activities in 
intelligence, bribery, and political intrigue,” often acting as a “law unto itself.”95 The 
AIOC failed to recognize the “rising national spirit” that was as much a regional 
phenomenon as it was Iranian, and as Rubin argues, by the time the AIOC responded to 
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the more moderate Iranian requests, that nationalist fervor had already placed significant 
popular pressure on Tehran.96 
Washington found itself negotiating with the British on Iran’s behalf in an attempt 
to maintain “political stability and continued oil production,” than to “provoke a 
counterproductive and bitter conflict.”97 This was possible because the U.S. interest in 
Iran was purely strategic, while the British had significant economic stakes in Iran. 
Despite efforts to negotiate a mutually beneficial arrangement between the British and the 
Iranians, it seemed unlikely that a concession both parties would agree to would 
materialize. Rubin highlights that Iranians were influenced, at least in part, by “American 
companies in Latin America and the Persian Gulf [that] were moving toward a 50/50 
profit split with the local governments,” and that it seemed unlikely that the Iranians 
would settle for anything less.98 Washington saw the Iranian government as plagued with 
a “traditional pattern of corruption,” a mismanaged economy, and a persistent inability to 
undertake serious social reforms, and the British as unwilling to meet the international 
norm of renegotiating its petroleum contracts, which only fueled growing Iranian 
nationalism.99  
C. IRANIAN ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS 
Iran continued to ask for U.S. aid, mostly for its military, and Washington 
continued to find the Iranian state’s financial capacity incapable of supporting more 
military equipment.100 Then the Shah found an opportunity to further persuade U.S. 
strategic interests with the communist invasion of South Korea. The Shah began 
expressing Iran’s military vulnerability to a similar communist invasion of Iran, and 
requested a $250 million loan, which Washington responded with only $25 million.101 
Rubin argues that this was symbolic of Washington’s policies that comprised a “pattern 
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of watching Iranian politicians go out onto a limb and then abandoning them there.”102 
Out on a limb is where then prime minister General Ali Razmara found himself. Rubin 
argues that “without United States aid, the Shah’s support, or British concessions on the 
oil issue, Razmara could find no way out of his dilemma.”103 Mohammad Mosaddegh 
had risen to the head of a Majlis committee to investigate the Supplemental Agreement 
with the British regarding the oil concessions on the same day that Razmara had been 
appointed as prime minister. Combined with supporters in the National Front, 
Mosaddegh began demanding nationalization of AIOC facilities and a complete 
cancellation of the oil concession.104 Despite Razmara’s attempts to mitigate the growing 
nationalism centered on the Iranian oil issue, and the British realization that a 50/50 share 
in profits similar to those that had just passed between Saudi Arabia and the United States 
would be desirable, the wave of nationalist fervor had already forced the Shah to pressure 
Razmara to push the issue forward.105 However, Razmara was assassinated on March 7, 
1951 by Khalil Tahmasibi, a member of the Islamic Fedayeen-i-Islam terrorist group, and 
on April 30, 1951, the Majlis passed a law that nationalized the AIOC, which the Shah 
also backed.106 In hindsight, the failure of the British to negotiate with the Iranians seems 
to have been a risky and unnecessary gamble. Rubin concludes that the British 
concessions would have been a “small price to pay,” in light of the turmoil that was to 
follow in the coming years.107 
The timing of this shift in Iranian domestic politics also coincided with a change 
of administration in the United States, as the Eisenhower administration was set to 
replace the Truman administration in 1952. John Foster Dulles replaced Dean Acheson as 
Secretary of State. Dulles’s younger brother Allen was the CIA director and gained 
greater access to the White House through that relationship. Rubin argues that combined 
with the atmosphere of McCarthyism, the “rapid Communist victory in China,” and the 
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tougher stance on communism that helped bring Eisenhower into office, only served to 
increase Washington’s trend toward “greater suspicion of Third World nationalism.”108 
Rubin argues that at this point, “covert activities, including deep involvement in foreign 
coups, were enthusiastically undertaken.”109 
D. NEW COLD WAR STRATEGIES 
Dwight Eisenhower entered office as the President of the United States in 1952, a 
Republican who won out after some 20 years of Democrat presidents. Athan Theoharis 
argues that Republicans during that year were able to campaign on “the perceived failures 
of the Truman administration: a seemingly indecisive and ineffective foreign policy, a 
seeming indifference to the Communist internal security threat, and a seemingly 
inefficient and corrupt domestic policy.”110 Upon taking office, Eisenhower had 
appointed former Republican president Herbert Hoover to head up a study to examine the 
Organization of the Executive Branch, and as part of this study, a commission to examine 
the CIA was included. That team was led by air force General James Doolittle due to the 
classified nature of that agency, and Doolittle’s findings went straight to the president. 
Theoharis argues:  
Doolittle’s commission endorsed ‘an aggressive covert 
psychological, political and paramilitary organization more 
effective than that employed by’ the Soviet Union . . . ‘it is 
now clear, . . . that we are facing an implacable enemy 
whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever 
means, and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a 
game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not 
apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing 
American concepts of ‘fair play’ must be reconsidered. We 
must develop; effective espionage and counterespionage 
services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy 
our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more 
effective methods than those used against us. It may 
become necessary that the American people will be made 
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acquainted with, understand, and support this 
fundamentally repugnant philosophy.111 
Perhaps more troubling than Doolittle’s assessment of the unavoidable need for 
the United States to engage in such strategies, is the reaction by leadership within the 
Armed Services Committee at that time. Senator Saltonstall framed the issue as one of 
“essential secrecy,” and stated that “it was not on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. 
Instead, “it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge 
on subjects which I personally as a member of Congress and as a citizen would rather not 
have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the 
lives of American citizens.”112 Senator Saltonstall’s fellow Armed Services Committee 
member, Senator Richard Russell, stated that “If there is one agency of government 
which we must take some matters of faith on, without the constant examination of its 
methods and sources, I believe that agency is the CIA.”113 These arguments proved 
persuasive, as the Senate voted down the proposal of Senator Mike Mansfield calling for 
a ten member oversight committee for the CIA in a 59–27 vote.114  
Theoharis highlights that a similar “deference” characterized oversight of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as well. 
The author argues that the Congressional deference continued throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, that “U.S. intelligence policy was at times set by presidents and at other times by 
the heads of the agencies,” and that “their actions were based on their personal 
conceptions of perceived national security threats.”115 Theoharis concluded that, 
“Eisenhower, beginning in 1953 and sustained throughout his presidency, turned to the 
CIA to orchestrate coups to overthrow nationalist leaders—in Iran in 1953 (Mohammad 
Mosaddegh), Guatemala in 1954 (Jacobo Arbenz Guzman), and Indonesia in 1958 
(Achmed Sukarno).”116 The absence of oversight of the decision to orchestrate these 
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types of operations likely enhanced interagency rivalries as these entities competed with 
one another for their own existence. The institutional structure that emerged was 
vehemently anti-communist and possessed no qualms for using whatever means available 
and deemed necessary to counter those threats.  
The emerging nuclear environment sowed fear and uncertainty in relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the early 1950s, however, the 
significance of effectively managing threat perceptions and communicating intent would 
not blossom until after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Aggressive—often brash—moves and 
countermoves during the early years of the Cold War influenced state behavior during 
these years. Ideology also played a role in shaping the way decision makers perceived the 
structure of the international environment. The institutional construct that emerged in the 
aftermath of World War II was driven largely by the roles that various regions of the 
world would play in the international economic model sought by Washington.  
E. LINKING IRAN TO GUATEMALA 
In August 1953, the United States executed a successful regime change in Iran, 
restoring the monarchical rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and ousting the Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Though an exhaustive analysis of operation AJAX is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, its connection to the interventions in Guatemala and Cuba 
is important for developing the causal relationship and the development of increasing 
returns that led to the institutional pathology that developed within the U.S. national 
security apparatus of the period. While most scholarship tends to focus on the role of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in executing these types of interventions, it is 
important to emphasize that these interventions were authorized by the president. These 
interventions did not occur under the Truman administration, but rather emerged with the 
Eisenhower administration, which took a tougher stance against communism. 
Stephen Kinzer argues that the Truman administration had frustrated then director 
of the CIA Allen Dulles due to the past tendency toward inaction in the fight against 
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communism.117 In fact, a tougher stance on communism was one of the driving debates 
of the campaign that brought the Eisenhower administration into office. Kinzer points out 
that Vice President Richard Nixon had referred to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 
policies as a “college of cowardly communist containment;” and that the truce to end the 
war in Korea had weakened Eisenhower’s political position, necessitating a strong stance 
against communism.118 The allure of a covert operation, plausibly deniable and 
potentially achievable in an “open society” as existed in Iran, proved to be a lucrative 
target for the Eisenhower administration; the fact that it bordered the Soviet Union and 
possessed lucrative oil reserves only increased the motivation and justification for the 
intervention.119 Yet even Kinzer fails to mention that Acheson had made “many attempts 
to work with Mosaddegh,” and that it was Mosaddegh’s “ill-fated decision to use the 
Communist threat as a means of gaining American support [that] boomeranged.”120 
Mosaddegh provided the rhetorical fuel to the fire that would bring about the justification 
for his own removal. What Barry Rubin points out as significant in the Iranian case, is 
that it is incorrect to say that the CIA replaced Mosaddegh with the Shah, but rather that 
the Agency provided the resources for the Iranians to do it themselves.121 Rubin argues 
that the Iranians themselves had feared both the instability that Mosaddegh was creating 
and they feared the Tudeh party’s motivations.122 Rubin concluded that what had been 
missed in the CIA, and particularly Allen Dulles’ understanding of the operation’s 
success, was that in Iran, “overthrowing Mosaddegh had been like pushing on an already-
opened door.”123 The preponderance of success had not come from specific actions by 
the CIA, but rather the favorable conditions provided by “support from the general 
population and a united military” that allowed for the operation’s success.124 Likewise, 
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the chief of the CIA operation, Kermit Roosevelt, concluded that, “we were successful in 
this venture because our assessment of the situation in Iran was correct . . . that if the 
people and the armed forces were shown that they must choose, that Mosaddegh was 
forcing them to choose, between their monarch and a revolutionary figure backed by the 
Soviet Union . . . the people and the army came, overwhelmingly, to the support of the 
Shah.”125 
Perhaps more significantly than the operation’s success, were its implications for 
the future of Iran. The operation virtually eliminated the checks and balances that had 
existed between the Shah, prime minister, and Majlis, and significantly strengthened the 
Shah’s power.126 Rubin argues that this brought about the end of representative 
government in Iran, and that “the middle class and the National Front, including many of 
Iran’s most capable, honest, and forward-looking people, were removed from any real 
role in the decision-making process.”127 When Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
asked that Kermit Roosevelt head up a similar operation in Guatemala, Roosevelt 
declined the offer, believing that the requirements for success would not exist in the same 
manner as they had in Iran.128 Rubin assesses that the success did alleviate the political 
instability created under Mosaddegh, “but did little to resolve the underlying problems of 
political legitimacy and cyclical economic crisis that had plagued Iran for so many 
decades.”129 Nonetheless, it confirmed for Washington that the CIA could orchestrate a 
low political cost method of regime change as an alternative to more costly conventional 
military interventions. 
F. CONCLUSION  
Economic nationalism was an influential political force in the developing world 
during the period, and appears to have motivated Mosaddegh and the Tudeh party’s 
attempt to nationalize Iranian oil, which also appears to have been part of a broader 
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decolonization process that sought to remove foreign influence from domestic economies 
in an effort to reshape institutions and consolidate national sovereignty. The United 
States found this to threaten sustainable economic growth in the developing world, and 
threatened strategic U.S. economic interests and private U.S. investments abroad. 
Similarities between economic nationalism and Soviet backed communism provided the 
rhetoric necessary to win political justification among policymakers for U.S. 
interventions in the Western Hemisphere, and Operation AJAX in Iran provided the first 
example of a politically low-cost tool for implementing favorable regime change. In this 
thesis, I argue that these perceptions led to an institutional pathology that drove the 
creation of Cold War policies contributed to the failed intervention at the Bay of Pigs in 
1961. Driven largely by Cold War ideological constructs stemming from these 
perceptions, the Eisenhower administration’s institutional development took on 
pathological characteristics that seem to have unwittingly opened the door to Soviet 
influence in the region, disrupted a more natural course of democratic social reform, and 
helped perpetuate many of the social challenges that continue to plague these regions. 
These unforeseen consequences eroded international perceptions regarding U.S. 
legitimacy, and provided rhetorical political fuel to domestic opposition groups both at 
home and abroad, at times strengthening their positions, and weakening U.S. soft power.  
The significance of this study lies in the outcomes that institutions have in 
shaping the behaviors of the bodies those institutions are meant to govern and direct. 
Institutions are meant to shape behavior, which produces a deterministic path toward 
future outcomes, and understanding the potential long-term implications of these 
processes is important for constructing institutions that lead to desirable outcomes. In the 
cases of U.S. interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, the rules created to shape the 
organizations that would interpret and respond to the threats of the period ultimately 
proved counterproductive toward long-term U.S. strategic interests in the Western 
Hemisphere and beyond. In the next two sections I argue that the path created by these 
policies carried the United States into interventions in Guatemala and Cuba, largely 
driven by the manner in which individual policymakers perceived and responded to their 
international and domestic environments while trying to manage both opportunities and 
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threats within their own institutionally constrained environments. This appears to have 
been particularly true in the case of Cuba, which built on the increasing returns from the 
operations in Iran and Guatemala, and ultimately led to a behavioral lock-in that 
detrimentally influenced those involved in planning the Bay of Pigs invasion. Those 
behavioral lock-ins, clouded by threat perceptions, combined with institutional changes 
implemented during the presidential changeover between Eisenhower and Kennedy 
immediately prior to the invasion and contributed significantly to the operation’s failure. 
While this is a specific case of institutional pathology, the phenomenon appears 
applicable to a range of institutional applications to overcome challenges and enhance 
techniques for institutional change. 
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III. GUATEMALA AND OPERATION PBSUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The circumstances surrounding the decision for American intervention in 
Guatemala’s internal politics in 1954 requires an understanding of the background of 
U.S. interests in Latin America juxtaposed against the international environment in 1954. 
The 1954 intervention both sought to counter communist influence in Guatemala and to 
secure long time U.S. economic interests in Guatemala. The early days of the Cold War 
had already polarized the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of capitalism 
and communism in a competition for a dominant global institution. Unfortunately for 
Guatemala, these interests intersected with a rise in nationalism and idealistic desires for 
social change by President Arbenz, which was interpreted by policymakers in the United 
States as a looming communist insurrection into the Americas. The evidence suggests 
that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala was driven by an inflated perception of Soviet 
backed communist encroachment in the hemisphere, and U.S. domestic ties to 
commercial interests in Guatemala, which combined in the form of both political and 
institutionally motivated opportunism. The preceding intervention in Iran the year prior 
confirmed the feasibility of orchestrating regime change in states with key U.S. interests. 
Likewise, the perceived success of the operation in Guatemala initiated a pattern of 
increasing returns and behavioral lock-in that propelled Washington forward into the Bay 
of Pigs failure. Analysis of the intervention in Guatemala demonstrates that success was 
not due to the conduct of the operation, or its design, but rather due to the inability of the 
Guatemalans to respond adequately to the intervention’s tactics. As the following 
analysis will demonstrate, this was not the most important factor regarding the 
intervention, and that in hindsight, a better understanding of the actual situation in the 
country could have led to a less risky operation, and certainly would have contributed to 
more effectively assessing and managing risk in the Cuban intervention that followed in 
1961. Understanding those conditions requires a more thorough understanding of the 
political economy of Guatemala during the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the 
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what is known as the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–1954. The social and political 
forces at work during this period greatly influenced the 1954 intervention. 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated the overthrow of Jacobo 
Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. The primary catalyst for this operation was the agrarian 
land reform that Arbenz instituted under Decree 900. The reform affected only 1,710 of 
the 341,191 private land holdings in the country, but comprised more than half of the 
private land holdings, much of which represented the holdings of the UFCO. The Office 
of Intelligence Research (OIR) for the State Department assessed that the implementation 
of the decree “would strengthen the government’s influence in the countryside and would 
provide the communists with ‘an excellent opportunity to extend their influence over the 
rural population.’”130 The reforms instigated a wave of violence in the countryside as 
landowners felt greatly undercompensated for the reforms.131 The linkage to communism 
and the threat to economic interests in the country provided the justification for the 
Eisenhower administration to execute the intervention, which managed to achieve its 
sought after ends of regime change. In the years that followed, it was later determined 
that the covert operation, codenamed “PBSUCCESS, was a success through dumb luck 
more than anything else,” and that it was only through the successful psychological 
operations that managed to intimidate Arbenz’s army into betraying him and forcing his 
resignation.132 The success of this operation played a significant role in the decision to 
invade Cuba that resulted in the failure at the Bay of Pigs seven years later. Washington 
officials seemed to find the linkage between nationalist economic policies and 
communism unacceptably dangerous, despite their own assessment that the reforms 
would extend government control into the countryside. Ironically, expanding government 
reach into the countryside continues to challenge the Guatemalan government today. In 
the years that followed the overthrow, U.S. aid to Guatemala increased significantly to 
$138 million between 1953 and 1961, second only to Bolivia in the region.133 Siekmeier 
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assessed that while private investment and economic growth did occur in Guatemala, so 
too did the division between rich and poor, and that the poor actually became worse off 
than they had been since food production actually decreased under that aid.134 The roots 
of that social class division lies in Central America’s postcolonial economic relationship 
with the United States. 
B. BANANA REPUBLIC AND COFFEE COUNTRY  
The extent to which coffee and bananas dominated Guatemala’s exports in the 
first half of the 20th century played a significant role in U.S. policy toward the country. 
Walter LaFeber summarized that the United Fruit Company (UFCO), “owned two huge 
plantations and monopolized the banana trade, but also controlled the docks in the 
nation’s ports, ran the railroad, provided its own ‘Great White Fleet’ for Guatemala’s 
merchant shipping, operated the country’s communication network, and provided loans to 
the profligate dictators.”135 By the 1930s, German entrepreneurs held the lion’s share of 
coffee exports, while UFCO dominated the banana trade. Washington officials found it 
concerning that German influence in Guatemala coincided with the rise of fascism in 
Europe, along with the Guatemalan president, Jorge Ubico’s fascination with Mussolini 
and Franco, including close relations to the German Minister in Guatemala City. As 
LaFeber points out though, Ubico was able to mitigate Washington officials’ concerns by 
allowing a U.S. officer to head the Guatemalan military academy, and in combination 
with rising banana prices and an increase in coffee purchases in the United States, shifted 
the German coffee share from 60 to 15 percent by 1939.136 Ubico was notorious for 
changing laws to prolong his stay in power, and U.S. policy at the time seemed to ignore 
Ubico’s dictatorial rule to protect its economic and political interests in Guatemala.137 
More importantly was the need to transition the responsibility for maintaining order in 
the region from U.S. Marines to local police forces controlled by regimes favorable to 
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Washington.138 By monopolizing economic and political influence, Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor policy “maintained order and protected private property” through support 
of pro American dictators in the region, including Ubico in Guatemala, and further 
ensured that what amounted to less than 2 percent of the population would continue to 
control most of the land.139 As LaFeber concluded, “the system could work as long as the 
few in Central America dominated the many.”140 
In 1944, an experiment in “national capitalism” sought to challenge this 
previously established “system.” James F. Siekmeier identified the goals of this 
movement as “asserting more control over their national resources, constraining the 
activities of foreign investors, and . . . branching out into several economic fields.”141 Up 
until that point, U.S. policy had found itself in somewhat of a legitimacy dilemma, 
seeking to improve conditions for the poor, but also wanting to ensure the status quo and 
position of elites, principally through expansion of American commercial and industrial 
undertakings.142 The status quo that had existed in Central America was one of 
traditional patrimony whereby a very small ruling elite class owned the majority of the 
land and controlled exports to the more developed world. While the Monroe Doctrine had 
laid out U.S. policy toward the region for much of the 1800s, U.S. interest in the region 
escalated dramatically during the presidential administration of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Langley and Schoonover refer to three epochs in Central America consisting of North 
American “opportunists, filibusters, and mercenaries” who “ravished Central America” 
from 1850 to 1870, 1900 to 1930, and again in the 1980s.143 As the authors conclude, 
these “soldiers of fortune and mercenaries” were responsible for the “expansion of 
slavery” and the “pursuit of wealth” which directly paralleled the “economic, social, and 
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political disequilibrium identified with industrial revolution.”144 Langley and Schoonover 
assessed that U.S. attitude toward the Americas was the outcome of an opportunistic shift 
in the political economy created by the industrial revolution and the frequently revived 
rhetoric of the Monroe Doctrine calling for the exclusion of any “foreign penetration” 
into the Western Hemisphere.”145 The Americas to the south represented a new land of 
opportunity for adventurous opportunists and risk takers, who could also enjoy operating 
outside of the laws more likely to be enforced within the United States, thus leading to 
the creation of a special relationship of U.S. protection of private interests in the region.  
Transnational companies dominated ownership of land in Central America during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by controlling agro-export economies. The use of 
the terms, “home” and “host” country, identified where a company was based out of and 
where it operated, respectively. As Langley and Schoonover point out, the “home” 
country for United, Standard, and Cuyamel fruit companies was the United States, while 
they operated in the “host” countries of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and 
Guatemala.146 These companies tended to control far more than just agricultural 
enterprise in their respective “host” countries, often dominating economic interests, and 
U.S. security interests in the region, including taking over from the French the 
construction of the Panama Canal in 1904. As Langley and Schoonover assess, U.S. 
policy at this time had begun to call for “replacement of non-U.S. interests in areas 
deemed strategically important or essential to canal security.”147 As the authors conclude, 
the problem with U.S. policy at this time lay in its hypocrisy. On the one hand, the United 
States wanted a developed and democratized Central America, yet on the other it wanted 
to secure its commercial and security interests, often through outright force. In 
Guatemala, this resulted in U.S. favor being afforded to President Manuel Estrada 
Cabrera in exchange for his favor toward the United Fruit Company.148 
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Part of the U.S. efforts in Guatemala involved running out German competition 
with the United Fruit Company.149 The security interest lay in Nicaragua’s resistance to 
the construction of the canal in Panama.150 The Guatemalan connection with Estrada 
Cabrera was thus useful in both camps, as he harbored a rivalry with Nicaragua’s Jose 
Santos Zelaya and was supportive of U.S. economic interests in Guatemala. As Langley 
and Schoonover point out, the Guatemalan president was known for employing lobbyists 
in Washington to secure his own domestic interests in exchange for favorability toward 
those U.S. commercial interests.151 One German who was run out of the country in 1908 
even accused the Guatemalan dictator of providing $10,000 to the campaign of Theodore 
Roosevelt.152 Regardless, Estrada Cabrera was known to have run a ruthless spy ring and 
effectively operated a “police state” in Guatemala, as his interests favored expanding 
Guatemalan control throughout Central America.153 This resulted in endless in-fighting 
between Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, in which the United States actually sought 
to end the perpetual conflict and bring “peace, progress, and, above all, stability” to the 
region.154 This leads one to believe that U.S. policy would have been to prop up dictators 
that would have a stabilizing presence over the region, however, this was actually not the 
case. As the authors argue, “U.S. officials and entrepreneurs could seldom agree about 
which isthmian leaders or factions best served U.S. interests, in part because these varied 
interests were often in conflict themselves.”155 In the case of Central America, and 
similarly in Cuba, the overlap of institutions, both formal and informal, all with divergent 
and adversarial ends in mind, contributed to the problems of effective rule of law and 
governance throughout the region, and made it difficult for Washington to choose sides.  
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C. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 
Understanding the process in which economic nationalism emerged in Latin 
America provides the process by which the Eisenhower administration developed 
institutions to counter these movements. After the conclusion of the Second World War, 
reform movements in Latin America that sought to address the centuries old societal 
divisions between wealthy elites and the impoverished also challenged U.S. economic 
interests in the Western Hemisphere. Economic nationalism became the label applied to 
movements that sought to challenge what was perceived as “foreign economic 
imperialism” in the region beginning in the first half of the 20th century. In Guatemala in 
1954, and in Cuba in 1961, this confrontation of economic institutions resulted in U.S. 
interventions in each of these countries to counter these movements, which the U.S. 
perceived and labeled as communist subversion. U.S. Cold War policy in the third world 
lies largely in these perceptions of domestic politics associated with economic nationalist 
movements, and I argue that U.S. policy toward Latin America often failed to distinguish 
important differences in these economic nationalist movements and communist 
subversion that ultimately—and unintentionally—opened the door to increased Soviet 
influence in the region. The successful intervention in Iran in 1953 set the stage for 
confrontations that would follow in the Western Hemisphere as it provided confirmation 
of a tactic to initiate regime change and provided Washington with increasing returns that 
further entrenched an aggressive policy to counter communism in the hemisphere. A look 
at the background to the economic situation that developed during the first half of the 
20th century in the Western Hemisphere sheds light on the greater phenomenon at work 
within the region. Analysis of the situation that emerged with regard to the United States, 
Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba suggests that the origins of the conflict were not entirely 
communist in nature and the institutions that were created to counter such movements 
were misguided from the start and subsequently took the United States down a path 
toward the failed intervention in Cuba. 
John Charles Chasteen provides an excellent summary regarding the background 
on economic nationalist movements in the Americas. The sense of nationalism in Latin 
America has its roots in the independence movements of the early 19th century; however, 
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it quickly faded in the chaotic environments that followed independence until it 
reemerged in the early 1900s with a “strong economic agenda.”156 This nationalism was 
a direct reaction to the “Great Export Boom” that occurred during the last quarter of the 
19th century, which in Mexico alone, “trade grew by 900 percent between 1877 and 
1910.”157 Coffee from Brazil, sugar from Cuba, minerals from Chile, wheat from 
Argentina, coffee and bananas from Guatemala and Honduras, cacao from Ecuador, and 
tin from Bolivia dominated the commodity boom.158 The greatest beneficiaries of this 
were the long-time elite landowners of Latin America, but the boom also paved the way 
for a rapidly growing middle and urban class, and led to drastic improvements in 
infrastructure to transport commodities to export facilities.159 During this period, 
however, the most impoverished populations of the region once again lost out, often 
having their native farm lands taken away from them, stripping them from their 
subsistence-oriented life styles.160 The massive growth in the economies in the region did 
not translate to improved conditions for the poorest, who lost their land, effectively 
destroying their subsistence economic systems.  
Plantation agriculture and heavy industrial mining were particularly responsible 
for sharpening the division between rich and poor in the region.161 The industrialization 
of commodity extraction required expensive refinement infrastructure that was typically 
paid for with foreign investment.162 Much of that foreign investment came from the 
United States. Chasteen describes banana production as a “neocolonial nightmare for the 
palm-studded coasts of the Caribbean.”163 Much of the banana production in this region 
was controlled by the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which operated in Costa Rica, 
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Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.”164 These types of 
operations were purely extractive, managed by white foreigners, and worked by unskilled 
local labor, and as Chasteen argues, when they ceased operations for various reasons in 
an area, they left behind “ex-banana choppers with no job, no land, no education, and a 
lot of missing fingers.”165 During the first quarter of the 20th century, these types of 
operations sparked a mass migration of people to urban centers in search of jobs.166 Still, 
it took time for this movement of people to occur, and during the first half of the 20th 
century, the politics of Latin America, though at times democratic, were largely 
controlled by wealthy land owners who actually took their local clients to the poles to 
vote on elections days.167 Populism drove domestic politics in the region, and political 
rhetoric divided along conservative lines that sought to maintain the status quo and 
reformist lines that sought to improve conditions and address the social inequities that 
had developed. Unfortunately, these reformist movements were often perceived as left 
leaning and communist backed, which shaped U.S. policy development in an attempt to 
stabilize the social discord in order to protect U.S. interests in the region. 
Foreign influence in the late 1800s and early 1900s shifted from British 
dominance to the United States, particularly in Mexico, Central America, and the 
Caribbean. In 1914 alone, the foreign investment in the region totaled $10 billion, $99 
million in Guatemala and $471 million in Cuba, half of which was British owned.168 U.S. 
interests in the region had increased steadily since the invasion of Mexico in the 1840s 
and Cuba in 1898, and by the early 1900s the United States was intervening regularly in 
Puerto Rico, Panama, Haiti, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.169 
Historians attribute much of this increase in U.S. interventionism to President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which sought not only to 
exclude European influence in the internal affairs of the Americas, but to spread U.S. 
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institutions throughout the Americas, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine.170 By 1929, the U.S. controlled some 40 percent of all foreign investment in 
the Americas, which influenced the establishment of the Pan-American Union for the 
encouragement of free trade within the hemisphere.171  
Interventions to protect and expand interests and investments in the region 
sparked a considerable degree of backlash and resentment toward U.S. policies. In the 
1920s, “U.S. Marines were in a five-year shooting war with Nicaraguan patriot guerillas” 
who accused the Unites States of “imperialism,” and created a hero out of Augusto César 
Sandino for standing up to the United States.172 This led to a growth in resistance 
movements and provided fuel for nationalist sentiments throughout the region. The 1929 
crash of the stock market caused the export generated wealth of Latin America to 
plummet. Chasteen argues that the crash crumbled the mechanism of dictatorial and 
oligarchical rule in the region, and allowed the nationalists to finally “shatter” the 
neocolonial mold.173 Combined with the international specter of communism, it also 
provided the domestic political rhetoric that shaped U.S. involvement in the region 
throughout the Cold War, and it became salient for political actors, particularly right 
wing military politicos, to label left of center opposition as communists. Economic 
nationalism became synonymous with communism, and any political group that leaned 
too far to the left, was likely to be labeled communist. 
Latin American nationalist movements began in Mexico, where U.S. influence, 
and “imperialism” as the Mexicans viewed it, had been the worst.174 The Mexican 
revolution was won by the Constitutionalists, who wrote into the Mexican Constitution 
measures such as “wage and hour laws, pensions and social benefits, the right to unionize 
and strike . . . sharply limited the privileges of foreigners . . . [and] curbed the rights of 
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the Catholic Church.”175 Nationalism differed in Argentina and Uruguay, where 
economic nationalism was born in the rhetoric of José Batlle y Ordóñez’s movement 
known as Batllismo, which Chasteen describes as, the “concerted state action against 
‘foreign economic imperialism.”176 The region also saw the birth of idigenismo during 
this period, particularly in Mexico and Peru, which championed indigenous society’s 
similarity to the Marxist theory of social construction.177 The linkage of Marxist theory 
with economic nationalism became important in the justification for U.S. interventions in 
Guatemala and Cuba and certainly contributed to U.S. interventions in the region, but it 
also affected domestic political competition for power in the region. What was born as 
reformist nationalism to both address social inequity and inspire domestic political 
support from the masses often looked very much like communism, a linkage that 
dominated institutional construction to counter those movements during the 1950s, both 
in the United States and within the nations of Latin America. 
The Great Depression accelerated the movement of economic nationalism in Latin 
America during the 1930s with the increase in industrial production in the region.178 It 
also legitimized arguments in favor of economic nationalism and independence from a 
dependent economic system with the United States that had developed during the late 
1800s. The large countries in the region, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, benefited from 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) since their size allowed them to diversify 
production and offered a larger consumer market for finished goods.179 Small, rural 
countries, like Guatemala and Cuba, benefited little from ISI since they lacked the market 
population and wealth for manufactured goods from many factories.180 Still the trend of 
ISI continued and flourished under the wartime conditions of the Second World War 
since the United States was focused on factory production of wartime material, opening 
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U.S. markets to Latin America’s producers.181 Chasteen argues that a great deal of social 
progress occurred in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, who benefited the most from ISI, 
however, Central America and the Caribbean followed the same “old-style landowning 
oligarchies” track of before.182 Latin America bifurcated down two separate 
institutionally driven paths, both of which would lead to ideological problems with the 
United States after World War II, but the small agricultural states were particularly 
divided. A small land owning oligarchy held most of the political power in countries like 
Guatemala and Cuba, had close ties to influential U.S. investors, and counted on that 
relationship to maintain the status quo. 
The end of the Second World War changed the economic structure in the 
hemisphere. The war machine of the United States was quickly converted to satisfy 
production of consumer goods for the reconstruction of Europe and East Asia. This meant 
that Latin America’s ISI factory production would no longer be able to compete with the 
United States, Europe, and the budding East Asian transformation that was to come. 
Populist rhetoric centered on nationalism had also grown to be the most politically useful 
way of garnishing domestic political support in the region. As Chasteen concludes, this 
rhetoric became, perhaps quite unfortunately, confused with “leftist, or even communist” 
speech by U.S. diplomats during the early days of the Cold War.183 Containing 
communism largely guided U.S. international behavior during the Cold War era, 
however, James F. Siekmeier argues that in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States saw 
Latin American nationalism as “both more prevalent and dangerous than 
communism.”184 Siekmeier’s observation points to the manner in which U.S. Cold War 
policy was constructed vis-à-vis the developing world, and that it was at least partially 
centered on the national security interest of U.S. economic capacity, largely an outcome 
of the huge bureaucratic wartime machine that dedicated institutions to focus on the war 
economy. Washington calculated that Latin America’s role in the economy was vital to 
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the achievement of postwar reconstruction and Cold War objectives, and that maintaining 
the status quo in Latin America posed less risk than the potential disruptions of either 
communism or economic nationalist movements. Thus, the United States created policies 
that sought to counter those forces in the region, yet also attempt to promote core U.S. 
democratic and humanitarian values. The contradictory nature of these policies wreaked 
havoc on perceived U.S. legitimacy in the region, and provided additional rhetoric for the 
economic nationalist and communist movements.  
Siekmeier argues that during the 1940s and 1950s, the United States used 
economic aid as a policy tool in an unsuccessful attempt at creating “strong, stable, 
nations that were firmly pro-United States.”185 In Guatemala, Juan Jose Arevalo 
described his country’s nationalism as “custom barriers, independent industry, protection 
of the native citizen, exaltation of creole life; and also just prices for raw materials 
produced inside our country [and sold on world markets], insistence on commercial 
equality, defense of our money, reciprocity, respect, dignity.”186 Washington officials 
tended to oppose economic nationalism because it placed limitations on foreign investors, 
access to natural resources, and participation in key sectors of the economies of the 
region.187 In Guatemala in particular, land reforms and increased agricultural 
productivity sought to increase individual purchasing power to lift much of the 
population out of abject poverty.188 Washington officials saw these types of moves as 
having the potential to “undermine the inter-American economic system” by limiting the 
“free flow of goods and investments between North and South America.”189 The United 
States envisioned a circular symbiotic relationship between North and South, whereby 
resources would flow out of Latin America and into U.S. factories that would assemble 
finished goods, which would then flow back into markets in Latin America and other 
parts of the world. Policymakers at the time thought that the smaller Latin American 
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countries would be best served not by following economic nationalist practices centered 
on independent economies, but rather by using each of their comparative advantages in 
their strongest sectors they would achieve the greatest economic growth. Washington 
officials felt that freer trade would lead toward sustainable economic growth, and the 
wealth generated from that growth would address the Latin American nations’ social, 
political, and economic demands to stabilize the region.190 To many in Latin America, 
these policies appeared to be thinly veiled justification for neocolonial imperialism, and 
populist leaders jumped on the opportunity to use that anti-imperialist rhetoric to gather 
domestic support within their countries. 
The 1944 revolution that brought democracy to Guatemala sought to diversify the 
country’s economy, place restrictions on foreign capital, and push the land reform issue 
forward.191 At the same time, in Argentina, populism was gathering steam under the 
leadership of Juan Peron, who had come to power in a coup orchestrated in 1943.192 
Siekmeier points out that the populism of Peron was not limited to Argentina, but was 
actually a regional phenomenon of the period, but that Peron was particularly 
troublesome for the United States because Argentina failed to support the Allies in World 
War II.193 U.S. officials also felt that Peron followed the 1933 to 1938 German pattern of 
governance, and despite U.S. appeals to the Argentine inherent desire for democracy, 
Peron was able to rally considerable support with his anti-American rhetoric.194 Anti-
imperialism resonated within the polities of Latin America. Yet, Peron eventually 
capitulated, patched relations with the United States, and agreed to enter into the Rio Pact 
of September 1947, an agreement that any attack on one American nation represented an 
attack on all.195 By the end of the 1940s the global security environment had become 
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more threatening; the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weaponry, China went 
communist, and the free world’s economies stagnated.196  
Siekmeier argues that the early 1950s security environment can best be 
understood by examining reports written toward the end of the Truman administration. 
The reports stated that funds for industrialization in the developing world must come 
from private sector capital, and that public sector aid should focus on infrastructure that 
would benefit private sector investments.197 The 1950 State Department policy objectives 
in Latin America were “the security of the United States and of this Hemisphere, the 
achievement of world peace, the encouragement of democratic representative institutions 
[in the region], and positive cooperation in the economic field in order to help the 
attainment of the first three objectives.”198 Siekmeier argues that the meaning of this 
policy statement signified that U.S. understanding of the U.S.-Latin American 
relationship was that the nations to the south of the United States would “produce raw 
materials and intermediate manufactured goods while the norteamericanos would offer 
finished goods [back to the south].”199 This arrangement directly contradicted the 
objectives of most economic nationalist movements in the region and virtually 
guarenteed future conflict. 
The United States feared that if economic nationalist movements took power they 
would implement economic policies in Latin America that would slow economic growth 
to the point that it would not be able to keep up with the growing population of the 
region, and would therefore represent a threat to the stability of the region and the 
security of the United States.200 Siekmeier argues that what economic nationalists 
actually sought was to “eliminate the feudal agriculture system that persisted in some 
Latin American countries; to incorporate the Indians into the economic, social, and 
political life of the region; to vastly reduce the oligarchy’s power; to increase the power 
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and participation in government of the lower and middle classes; and to diversify the 
economy in order to mitigate the pernicious effects of monoculture.”201 Of course, much 
of U.S. interest in the region lay in private investment, by 1944 in Guatemala alone, some 
$93 million was concentrated in three U.S. companies, the Empresa Elélectrica, 
International Railways of Central America (IRCA), and the United Fruit Company 
(UFCO).202 The UFCO commanded an annual budget larger than the Central American 
countries in which it operated, and as Piero Gleijeses argues, was politically well 
connected in Massachusetts: Thomas Cabot had been the “company’s president in 1948, 
and his brother, John Moors, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in 
1953.”203 The UFCO was also Guatemala’s largest private land owner with over half a 
million acres, and employed 15,000 Guatemalans.204 Despite the seemingly entrenched 
connections with government, Gleijeses points out that the U.S. government had never 
directly intervened on behalf of UFCO until the presidency of Arevalo, and that in fact, 
the UFCO had made considerable contributions toward the development of medical and 
sanitation services, and the company’s workers were “better paid, better fed, and better 
housed than those who toiled for other landowners.”205 Still, conditions in Guatemala 
created a great sense of social injustice, and there was considerable dissent from the right 
regarding the reform efforts of Arevalo, and more especially, those of his successor 
Jacobo Arbenz. 
Fredrick R. Pike argued that the passage of the 1946 social security law, and the 
1947 labor codes in Guatemala aroused “bitter opposition . . . in the ranks of the 
visionless landed aristocrats of the country.”206 During the 1950 election, Jacobo Arbenz 
was expected to have been defeated by the leading candidate Francisco Javier Arana, who 
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was also anti-communist and supported the interests of Guatemala’s right.207 During the 
campaign, Arana was gunned down in the summer of 1949, ensuring Arbenz’s ascension 
to the presidency. Pike points out the suspicious connection with his murder, and also that 
Arbenz was complicit in the development of the secret (until 1950) communist party led 
by Jose Manuel Fortuny, who sympathized with Arbenz’s fascinations for more land, tax, 
education, and labor reforms.208 The communist party in Guatemala was growing under 
the auspices of economic nationalism, but the most influential interests remained in the 
major economic enterprises controlled by the right and supported by U.S. investments in 
the country. 
In the United States, Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, two Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) economists, prepared a paper for the White House entitled, 
“A Proposal for a New United States Economic Policy,” which highlighted the rise of the 
Soviet Union, the general apathy felt toward economic improvement in the developing 
world, and the potential this had for increasing communist influence in the developing 
world.209 Millikan and Rostow argued that the United States needed to demonstrate to the 
developing world that rapid economic growth was possible under liberal capitalist 
principles.210 The economists felt that too much of U.S. aid was going directly to military 
assistance and not enough toward development, and that long term development was 
more strategically important than just winning short term Cold War battles.211 They 
envisioned the United States injecting billions of dollars in aid into the non-industrialized 
world to expand these nation’s stock of plants and machinery for production.212 Millikan 
and Rostow’s proposal was essentially shot down by Milo Perkins, head of the Council of 
Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), who argued that it would be “psychologically unwise 
to raise expectations in poor nations that could not be met,” and that “communists often 
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made their greatest gains where living standards were in an upswing.”213 Perkins’ 
arguments won President Eisenhower’s endorsement. 
Christopher Baughn and Attila Yaprak found linkage between nationalistic 
economic policies with other measures of national and international orientations by 
states, and found a readiness to support such policies exists when a perceived economic 
threat posed by foreign economic competition emerges.214 These authors found that the 
competition for scarce resources, such as jobs and economic benefit, suggests “elevations 
in economic nationalism as a function of unfavorable economic conditions,” with the 
strongest indicator being the level of perceived threat felt within the state.215 Baughn and 
Yaprak felt that these indicators may be useful in tracking the “ebb and flow” over time, 
using heightened economic nationalism as a potential indicator of inter-state conflict.216 
There seems have been either a perception of threat to the scarce resources that Baughn 
and Yaprak consider critical to creating increased sentiments of economic nationalism, as 
well as the perception of imperial contestation over who would profit from those 
resources, which led to policies that helped guide the path for U.S. interventions in Iran, 
Guatemala, and Cuba. The growth in economic nationalism in those countries threatened 
U.S. interests in the region and also inspired anti-imperialism within in large enough 
segments of those populations to become politically salient. U.S. policy’s aimed and 
intentioned at achieving economic growth in the Third World were perceived as 
threatening by large segments of those populations, and once those movements became 
intertwined with the specter of communist subversion, U.S. intervention became 
inevitable.  
D. THE KENNAN FAMILY AND THEIR COLD WAR 
A simplistic analysis of Latin America’s position during the Cold War as merely 
another battleground of the containment strategies proposed by the Soviet expert George 
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Kennan fails to account for the highly competitive interests that had been battling within 
Latin America for nearly 100 years. In his famous memorandum to then Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, on March 29, 1950, Kennan assesses that the principal security 
interest within Latin America lay in the vital access to that region’s natural resources in 
the event of a war with the Soviet Union. His assessment of the international community 
at the time is summed up in his statement that it was an arena of “band-wagon 
psychology in which nothing succeeds like success.”217 Kennan assessed that if there was 
a sudden loss of connection with the Eurasian landmass in conjunction with a lack of 
allegiance among the nations of the Americas, then the probability for conflict among the 
United States and its southern neighbors would have increased. His assessment of Latin 
America was quite fatalistic, as he described the region doomed as a result of “the large 
scale importation of Negro slave elements . . . extensive intermarriage of all these 
elements . . . which seemed to have weighed scarcely less heavily on the chances for 
human progress.”218 In retrospect, his notion that the Latin American citizen “lives, by 
and large, by a species of make-believe: not the systematized, purposeful make-believe of 
Russian communism, but a highly personalized, anarchical make-believe, in which each 
individual spins around him, like a cocoon, his own little world of pretense, and demands 
its recognition by others as the condition of his participation in the social process,” 
speaks to the U.S. exceptionalism of the time, but his conclusion that the average foreign 
representative who finds him or herself in this “Alice Wonderland” environment, and 
feels compelled toward “cynicism, participation, or acute unhappiness,” seems to be quite 
an accurate assessment.219 Overt racism and exceptionalism was pervasive in the minds 
of policymakers during the period, and thus the institutions they created were heavily 
influenced by those biases. 
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E. THE SOVIET CONNECTION TO LATIN AMERICA 
Kennan summed up the relationship between the Latin American communist and 
Moscow as “tenuous and indirect,” due to the character of Latin Americans as inclined 
toward “individualism, to indiscipline and to a personalized, rather than doctrinaire, 
approach to their responsibilities as communists, they sometimes have little resemblance 
to the highly disciplined communists of Europe, and are less conscious of their status as 
tools of Moscow.”220 Kennan goes on to explain that Soviet leadership in Moscow 
probably viewed Latin American communists with “a mixture of amusement, contempt, 
and anxiety,” and that he concluded that the greatest threat of popular support of 
communism in Latin America existed in Guatemala. Kennan is largely regarded for the 
influence his writings had on the U.S. containment strategy that developed during the 
Cold War. While a deep analysis of Cold War escalations is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is important to note that in the years after the covert interventions in Latin 
America, George Kennan felt “the United States should not fuss too much over Latin 
Americans, but ‘expect less of them and try to get them to expect less of us, to give up 
the search for understanding or popularity, to wait for them to come to us.’”221 This is 
significant because had Kennan known the events that were going to unfold in the next 
few years in Guatemala, he may have worded his assessment differently.  
The wording of his memorandum and his references of prior policy centered on 
the tenants of the Monroe Doctrine does suggest that he felt the United States should 
view stopping communist encroachment into the Western Hemisphere as a vital strategic 
interest. Certainly his statement suggesting that where local popular resistance was not 
enough that “harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that 
these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not 
stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and 
such methods may be preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further 
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communist successes,” played a role in policy formulation.222 The entirety of the 
memorandum suggests a firm stance against the spread of communism in the Americas, 
but actually does reject any form of militant anti-communism undertaking that could have 
been used as propaganda by the communists. Rather, Kennan argues that the United 
States should leverage its position of superiority and the needs of other weaker American 
states to recognize the utility of good international relations with the United States.223 
Interestingly, the writing in the memorandum can be interpreted as the reader wishes, 
promoting either interventionism, or noninterventionism, depending how it is understood 
by the individual reader. 
Today, most scholars generally agree that Soviet influence in Latin America 
during the 1940s and 1950s was indirect at best, and that a true interest in the region did 
not develop until after the successes of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and Fidel Castro’s 
ability to survive in, what they viewed as the U.S. sphere of domination.224 Nicola Miller 
points out that “in 1951, Stalin [denounced] the exclusion from the United Nations of the 
People’s Republic of China, [and] berated the twenty Latin American republics for being 
the ‘most solid and obedient army of the United States.’”225 Edgar Bravo’s 1978 
dissertation, The Soviet View of the Latin American Military Regimes, offers an 
interesting perspective on Soviet attitudes toward Latin America. Generally, Moscow 
viewed Latin American militaries as merely a police force for the “bourgeoisie” elites, 
and the common peasants as too backward and uneducated to be inspired to the 
revolutionary cause.226 Most populist uprisings amounted to little more than militant 
regime changes across the region. However, as Bravo points out, this interest changed 
with Guatemala’s revolution first under Arevalo and later under Arbenz.227 For the 
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Soviets, Arbenz’s failure was “due to the ‘cowardice and treachery of certain bourgeois 
circles in Guatemala which played a role in the success of the counterrevolution.’”228  
The failure was understood to have been due to “limited arms shipments and 
‘advice’ from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.”229 Bravo concludes that the Soviets 
interpreted that the eventual assassinations of General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 
1956, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in 1957, and General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 
the Dominican Republic in 1961, and likewise the overthrow of military dictatorships in 
Argentina in 1955; Peru, Haiti, and Colombia in 1956; Venezuela in 1957; Cuba in 1959; 
and El Salvador in 1960, were “proof of the masses’ desire to get rid of their oppressors 
and of the ‘general advance of the liberation movement’ in that period.”230 It would seem 
that, at least in the eyes of Moscow, that the operation to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala 
sparked a chain reaction of popular working class uprisings against what they perceived 
as the imperial United States, yet as Bravo points out, even the Soviets viewed all of 
these—minus Cuba—as failed efforts due to the various movements’ inability to 
“consolidate the gains [they had] achieved.”231 Thus, the danger to national security 
posed by these leftist movements was much less than Washington argued them to be, and 
the aggressive policies taken to contain them had as much a role in destabilizing the 
region as it did in protecting it. The plausible counterfactual argument is that in many of 
these cases, through domestic political balancing, the issues would have likely resolved 
themselves absent of U.S. intervention. 
F. GUATEMALAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
For the 16 years prior to 1944, Jorge Ubico’s military dictatorship ruled over 
Guatemala. Ubico saw himself as a beloved dictator by his people, likened himself in the 
image of Napoleon, and had been sympathetic to Hitler and the Nazi cause until 
Washington officials corrected him, sending down FBI agents to oversee internment of 
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German Guatemalans during the war years.232 Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that the 
dictator ruled Guatemala for the wealthy elite with the mandate to prevent any social 
change within the country, and that he did so with “ruthless gusto.”233 The authors state 
that “he massacred rebellious Indians, killed labor leaders and intellectuals and enriched 
his friends,” and that “the long-suffering country reached a ‘savage climax under the 
megalomaniac General Jorge Ubico.”234 While Schlesinger and Kinzer state that the 
dictator’s contributions were merely “a handful of schools, some inadequate roads and an 
airport,”235 James Siekmeier argues that, in fact, Ubico “had sown the seeds of his own 
destruction,” through his promotion of economic growth that primarily benefited the 
elites, but also partially gave rise to a dissatisfied middle class.236 Siekmeier also points 
out that the World War II experience and the rhetoric of Franklin Roosevelt speaking of 
universal ideals of “peace, freedom, and prosperity,” resonated powerfully in the ears of 
many Latin Americans, including Guatemala’s budding middle class.237 
Perhaps most interesting in the saga of Guatemala is the manner in which this 
dictator was removed from power. In what came to be known as the “Petition of the 311,” 
some 311 “teachers, lawyers, doctors, small businessmen, and other citizens,” many of 
whom were friends of the general, presented him with a petition calling for him to step 
down.238 Ubico, who was shocked at the lack of popular support, relinquished power to 
General Frederico Ponce. Ponce quickly moved to consolidate his position through a 
fictitious election that would guarantee him a fictitious popular mandate. However, his 
aspirations were cut short by a plot orchestrated by two army officers, Major Francisco 
Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz, who executed a revolt known as the “October 
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Revolution,” and forced Ponce to flee the country in an arrangement brokered by the 
chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala.239 
Ubico’s protesters asked a popular teacher, who at the time was living in 
Argentina, Dr. Juan José Arevalo Bermejo, to return to Guatemala and run as the 
candidate of choice in the elections that Arana-Arbenz junta had arranged. Arevalo’s 
popularity was due in part to his “uplifting textbooks on history, geography, and civics 
that were in use throughout Guatemala.”240 Schlesinger and Kinzer also point out that the 
junta saw Arevalo as a “clean” civilian and that the two hoped to “manage” the new 
president after he came into office.241 When Arevalo arrived to Guatemala from 
Argentina in the fall of 1945, he was greeted by cheering crowds and won the presidency 
that December with more than 85 percent of the vote.242 The reforms instituted were 
wide spread and immediate. The old regime of military generals was removed 
completely, and a number of measures to create a democratic system that limited terms of 
office and set up checks of powers between the Congress, Supreme Court, and the 
Executive branches. The reforms also, for the first time, set up elections for local 
representation of mayors and local councilors. A Bill of Rights was instituted that 
guaranteed numerous social equalities, including equality between husbands and wives, 
equal pay for men and women, laws against racial discrimination, anti-trust measures, 
university autonomy from government control, and other forms of social justice before 
unbeknownst to Guatemalans.243 Arevalo also proclaimed his disdain for communism, 
that it was “contrary to human nature,” and professed the “superiority of democracy, 
which does not seek to destroy anything that man has accomplished, but humbly seeks to 
‘straighten out crooked paths.’”244  
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Siekmeier points out that the reforms also included the encouragement of workers 
to “organize and bargain collectively.”245 He also argues that the United States was 
initially supportive of the reforms undertaken in Guatemala, stating that the Guatemalan 
law, Decree Number 459, “gave economic incentives to foreign capitalists who wanted to 
export capital and goods to Guatemala.”246 Siekmeier argues that the U.S. concern with 
Guatemalan initiatives arose due to its contradictory nature in regard to intra-
hemispherical relations in Latin America.247 During the 1947 signing of the Rio Pact, the 
Guatemalans challenged the U.S. delegation with wording of the final portion of the 
agreement regarding the definition of aggression by another state. The Guatemalans felt 
the language should require signatories to “abstain from lending aid, direct or indirect, to 
any aggression or attempts thereof against one or more of the other signatory states and 
prevent, in their territory, the exercise of any objectives which aim to change the 
constitutional regime of the others by means of force,” while the U.S. delegates sought to 
define “aggression as simply ‘unprovoked armed attack.’”248 Then, in 1948, the 
Guatemalans again challenged U.S. delegates and their assertion at the Bogota 
convention regarding expropriations of foreign nationals’ property arguing that these 
individuals should be “compensated in a ‘prompt, adequate, and effective manner.”249 
Guatemala, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Venezuela, and Honduras countered this 
argument, stating that the manner in which expropriations would be determined should be 
a matter independent and in accordance to each countries constitutional laws.250 
Siekmeier argues that the Guatemalans saw this as room for “foreign investors to argue 
that they were not subject to the laws of the host country.”251 The author points out that 
much of Arevalo’s encouragement in foreign investment was actually unattractive for 
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investors due to the stipulations for benefits to the Guatemalan people.252 The U.S. 
government was particularly “distressed” over the concessions to foreign oil companies, 
and the collective bargaining movements of Guatemalan workers. Siekmeier points out 
that the reforms were “particularly stringent” for foreign companies employing 500 or 
more Guatemalans, and that this was a point of contention with the United Fruit 
Company because they felt that this measure unfairly targeted them specifically.253 As 
Schlesinger and Kinzer argue, “some 40,000 Guatemalans depended directly or indirectly 
on the United Fruit Company and its subsidiaries,” and that most peasant workers earned 
between five and 20 cents per day, and even experienced bank clerks only took home 90 
dollars a month.254 The company certainly had enormously powerful influence within the 
country. 
Arevalo possessed a “romantic vision of Guatemala” according to Schlesinger and 
Kinzer, highlighting that his speeches contained a vision of “spiritual” socialism centered 
on a “fundamental change in human values.”255 These reforms came at a particularly 
dangerous time for the Guatemalans. Prior to the formation of the CIA, the FBI held 
responsibility for intelligence collection in the Americas, and as the two authors point 
out, were tipped off by former Ubico supporters that a “Communist influence” lay behind 
Arevalo’s Labor Code and the collective bargaining movements.256 Throughout 
Arevalo’s presidency, he was constantly challenged by the conservative Colonel 
Francisco Arana, the same Arana that had orchestrated the 1944 revolt that allowed 
Arevalo to secure the presidency. Colonel Arana commanded considerable support and 
even threatened to use the armed forces to dissolve the Congress when they tried to 
remove him from his military position. At the same time, a more liberal movement that 
wanted to proceed with more ambitious social reforms organized opposition to Colonel 
Arana’s growing support, and chose his counterpart in the 1944 revolt, then Defense 
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Minister Jacobo Arbenz. As Schlesinger and Kinzer argue, Arana and Arbenz were 
equally popular candidates, but on July 18, 1949, Colonel Arana was gunned down by the 
chauffeur of Arbenz’s wife in a plot organized by one of his associates who was 
apparently a known communist “firebrand.”257 Then in November 1950, Castillo Armas, 
who “revered” Arana, led a group of 70 men in a failed uprising against Arbenz. Armas 
nearly lost his life in the uprising, was arrested, jailed and sentenced to death. He 
subsequently escaped, supposedly through a tunnel underneath the prison in which he 
was held, but many suspect that a more likely escape route was through bribery.258 
Armas spent the next several years in Colombia and Honduras, plotting a return to 
Guatemala, until he was approached by the CIA in August 1953, and eventually 
appointed as the chosen “liberator” of Guatemala.”259 Guatemala may have found 
democracy, but it was still coping with intensely violent domestic politics. 
G. LAND REFORM IN GUATEMALA 
Under Arevalo’s presidency there was a considerable amount of social progress in 
Guatemalan society, but the most important issue, that of land reform, had yet to be 
resolved. According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, annual per capita income of agricultural 
workers in 1950 was 87 dollars per year, 2.2 percent of landowners owned 70 percent of 
the nation’s arable land, and Guatemala’s entire industrial sector employed 23,000, less 
employees than the United Fruit Company.260 Bringing Guatemalans out of the feudal 
agriculture economy was one of Arbenz’s primary objectives during his time in office. 
Schlesinger and Kinzer even highlight an International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) report on Guatemala that called for reforms in many of the 
same areas, including energy, regulation of foreign business, tax reforms, which included 
“stinging criticism of the Guatemalan upper class for holding prices unnecessarily high, 
seeking exorbitant profits and investing them abroad.”261 The agrarian reform act, issued 
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as Decree 900, expropriated only uncultivated portions of large plantations, with 
complete exemptions for farms under 223 acres, farms of 223–670 acres cultivated at 
two-thirds or more, and any farm that was fully worked. The government issued 25 year 
bonds at three percent for the declared taxable worth of the land in May 1952.262 For 
United Fruit Company, this was especially upsetting because they were in the habit of 
undervaluing their land to reduce their tax liability.263 As Schlesinger and Kinzer 
highlight, after eighteen months, the government had paid $8,345,545 in bonds and 
provided nearly 100,000 families with 1.5 million acres in land; the expropriated lands 
also included President Arbenz’s dowry of 1,200 acres from his wealthy Salvadoran wife, 
and land of his political allies.264  
Problems with the reforms began almost immediately for Arbenz. Schlesinger and 
Kinzer argue that the reasons behind these problems included: peasants anxious for more 
land, peasants awaiting land that had not yet been appropriated, hostilities committed 
against frightened landowners, and most unfortunately Arbenz’s government composed 
of communist leaders organizing leftist movements hoping to spark a more Marxist-
Leninist style revolution.265 The authors argue that while Arbenz did not join any 
political party, he was supported by the communist party in Guatemala, but that the 
infiltration of the communists into government entities was minimal.266 The communists 
had no authority in “the National Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and most 
domestic bureaucracies other than the land reform and communications agencies.”267 
Schlesinger and Kinzer argue that there is no credible evidence that Arbenz was under 
foreign communist influence, that the Soviets were very cautious in their approach 
toward Guatemala at that time, and that Arbenz may have tolerated the communists more 
out of respect for the democratic process.268 As the authors conclude, what most 
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concerned status quo elites were the access to ideas and organizational movements that 
the reforms of Arevalo and Arbenz had “brought to poor Indians and ladinos in rural 
Guatemala.”269 
In March 1953, the land reforms seized some 209,842 acres of United Fruit 
Companies uncultivated land, and the government offered the company $2.99 per acre.270 
United Fruit Company had paid $1.48 per acre when they purchased the land twenty 
years earlier, but the U.S. State Department insisted that the company be reimbursed at 
$75 per acre.271 Then in October 1953 and February 1954, Arbenz’s government 
expropriated two more plots of uncultivated land from the fruit company, bringing the 
total to 386,901 acres.272 Schlesinger and Kinzer emphasize that while the State 
Department was negotiating with Arbenz government to mediate the dispute with the 
United Fruit Company, that the company was, at the same time, lobbying in the United 
States with elements of government to come to their aid, chiefly the heads of the CIA and 
State Department.273 The result would be formulation of a policy to remove Arbenz from 
power and replace him with someone more agreeable to U.S. interests in Guatemala, both 
opposed to communism, and more protective of U.S. private investments. 
H. OPERATION PBSUCCESS 
James F. Petras and Morris H. Morley concluded that in the 1950s, “the 
convergence of U.S. policy and investor interests with those of the Central American 
ruling classes led to a historic compromise in which successive U.S. administrations 
sacrificed democratic rights in exchange for capitalist economic opportunity and U.S. 
strategic interests.”274 The masterminds in Washington behind the plot to overthrow 
Arbenz and install Colonel Castillo Armas were the brothers John Foster Dulles, then 
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Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles, then Director of the CIA. Foster Dulles assessed that 
the sitting ambassador was unqualified to oversee a coup and decided to replace him with 
John Peurifoy, who had been working in Greece, and was also a Democrat. Which 
Schlesinger and Kinzer point out, was the “more Machiavellian . . . choice: Peurifoy, as a 
Democrat, was a perfect fall guy for the Republican administration if the coup went 
awry.”275 Peurifoy did not speak Spanish and knew nothing of Guatemala, during his rise 
within the State Department, he came under Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist 
accusations targeted at the State Department, managed to emerge undamaged, but 
thereafter always felt the need to “prove his staunch anti-communism.”276 He arrived in 
Guatemala in October 1953, received a briefing from then Foreign Minister Dr. Raul 
Osegueda about the situation in the country and the virtues of the reforms. At the close of 
the two hour brief, Peurifoy spoke for the first time, “chastising Osegueda’s government 
for taking over United Fruit Company land,” and inquiring if the foreign minister was 
aware that China had also instituted land reforms that led to communism.277 
The ambassadors’ cables to Washington only reinforced his initial assessment that 
Arbenz was a communist supporter and could only be dealt with by removal from 
power.278 In a January 1954 interview, Peurifoy’s told Time magazine that, “Public 
opinion in the U.S. might force us to take some measures to prevent Guatemala from 
falling into the lap of international Communism . . . we cannot permit a Soviet Republic 
to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal.”279 The provocative nature of 
that statement almost cost Peurifoy expulsion from office, and that same month, President 
Eisenhower met with Guatemala’s ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Toriello. 
During the encounter, Toriello was taken aback by Eisenhower’s “abysmal ignorance of 
Guatemala,” later writing that the president “could hardly believe the exaggerated 
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privileges which [foreign] firms have enjoyed [in Guatemala].”280 Schlesinger and 
Kinzer point out that this must have been a feign by Eisenhower as six months earlier he 
had already given the order to overthrow Arbenz.281 The decision to covertly orchestrate 
the regime change had apparently already been decided upon. 
The greatest public condemnation of Arbenz’s administration came from John 
Foster Dulles at the 10th Inter-American Conference of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) in Caracas, Venezuela, in March 1954. Dulles called upon the Rio Treaty of 
1947, stating that ‘“the domination or control of the political institutions of any American 
state by the international communist movement . . . would constitute a threat” to the 
entire hemisphere and require “appropriate action in accordance with existing 
treaties.”‘282 Ambassador Toriello, responded during the OAS conference to Dulles 
remarks, calling out specifically the U.S. efforts to block Guatemala’s national liberation 
and its support to the United Fruit Company, “cataloguing as ‘communism’ every 
manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, 
any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive and liberal reforms.”283 Dulles 
won the day at the conference, the delegation passed his resolution, but even U.S. press 
reports concluded that “America’s heavy-handed tactics had decreased its prestige in 
Latin America,” and that the other Latin American diplomats were very sensitive and 
receptive to the words spoken by Toriello.284 
The most fateful of decisions for Arbenz was probably his decision in the spring 
of 1954 to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. At the time, Arbenz felt an invasion led by 
Castillo Armas was imminent, and that, according to Schlesinger and Kinzer, 
Czechoslovakia was a “kind of last resort,” since all of the country’s usual suppliers 
refused to sell to Arbenz.285 The CIA monitored the arms shipment all the way from the 
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ship’s loading in Czechoslovakia, and tracked its movement to Guatemala. Apparently 
this was convenient for the CIA as they had already been working a staged “discovery” 
of Soviet marked boxes of rifles by Nicaraguan police as pretext for Castillo Armas’ 
pending invasion of Guatemala.286 Washington officials determined this as sufficient 
cause to begin the operation, first with a failed covert attempt to derail the train carrying 
the arms from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City, then with an information operation to 
sway public opinion in the United States, led by Foster Dulles’ declarations to the press 
that it could signal a communist build up near the canal zone.287 Unfortunately, for 
Arbenz, the shipment contained virtually useless weaponry, including antitank guns and 
artillery pieces that were impractical for use in the Guatemalan environment at that time, 
and nonfunctional machine guns and rifles, a shipment that the New York Times later 
dubbed, “white elephants.”288 Nick Cullather called the Alfhem (the name of the Czech 
ship) incident, a “propaganda bonanza,” stating that the State Department “declared that 
the shipment revealed Guatemala’s complicity in a Soviet plan for Communist conquest 
of the Americas.”289 Cullather also highlighted the rhetoric coming from U.S. 
Congressmen at the time, Representative Paul Lantaff likening the event as as a “signal to 
ride . . . if Paul Revere were living today,” and House Speaker John McCormack’s fiery 
statement that “this cargo of arms is like an atom bomb planted in the rear of our 
backyard.”290  
The Alfhem incident was the catalyst that Washington needed to initiate the 
operation to overthrow Arbenz, and the CIA codenamed that operation, PBSUCCESS. 
Before the operation could begin, Washington decided to increase pressure on Arbenz’s 
government with a sea blockade named HARDROCK BAKER, which Cullather points 
out that its “blatant illegality made it a powerful weapon of intimidation” against the 
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Guatemalans.291 Operation PBSUCCESS itself used an effective propaganda campaign 
of disinformation that resulted in sufficient panic in Guatemala, the army, and Arbenz 
himself, that he felt compelled to resign. Schlesinger and Kinzer state that members of 
the United States Information Agency “wrote more than 200 articles about Guatemala 
based on information from CIA sources, and distributed them in scores of Latin 
newspapers.”292 The agency also distributed tens of thousands of anti-communist 
pamphlets, cartoons, and posters in Guatemala, and produced three propaganda movies in 
support of the operation.293 The authors point out that the most effective of the 
propaganda tools was the use of clandestine radio campaigns in Guatemala, which 
targeted specifically “women, soldiers, workers, and young people,” to encourage them 
to join the Castillo Armas’ Liberation movement.294 
The loss of two planes conducting psychological terror operations and Castillo 
Armas’ troops faltering during the operation, forced Washington to make decisions on 
how committed the officials were to seeing the operation through. The decision to 
orchestrate PBSUCCESS was significant because that type of unilateral anti-communist 
action had been prohibited in the resolution passed at the OAS meeting that March.295 
Rumors that the United States was behind the events unfolding in Guatemala were 
already being published in newspapers, and Foreign Minister Toriello had called upon 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to provide support against the planes that were 
attacking targets in Guatemala from Honduras and Nicaragua.296 Of course the United 
States ignored those pleas. The confusion created by the CIA operation was enough to 
force Arbenz to believe that he had lost control of his army and that Castillo Armas was 
garnering support within Guatemala. Ambassador Peurifoy filtered virtually every piece 
of information that went to the press at the time, and the press painted a story of Castillo 
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Armas and his liberating rebels fighting off a “Goliath-like Red Army.”297 Despite the 
apparent absurdity of this notion, Arbenz gave his resignation on June 27, 1954. 
Cullather points out that in the 11 days that followed Arbenz’s resignation, “five 
successive juntas occupied the presidential palace, each more amenable than the last,” but 
that Peurifoy wanted Castillo Armas in office. Peurifoy finally persuaded an agreement at 
the negotiations that took place in El Salvador for a “combined Army-liberacionista 
junta.”298 Many of the leading communists evaded capture in the confusion that followed 
the coup, which ultimately led to many of the problems the United States and Castillo 
Armas’ government faced in the coming years.299 In the aftermath of the coup, a team 
from the State Department, aided by Castillo Armas’ junta, confiscated 150,000 official 
documents, but as Cullather points out, “most of what was found had only ‘local 
significance,’ with little relevance to ‘the elements of Soviet support and control of 
Communism in Guatemala’ that had been justification for the intervention.”300 Cullather 
goes further to highlight the research findings of Ronald M. Schneider’s investigation 
into the PBHISTORY documents regarding the coup. Cullather stated that Schneider had 
“found no traces of Soviet control and substantial evidence that Guatemalan Communists 
acted alone, without support or guidance from outside the country.”301 Still, the State 
Department team put together a book for the “National Security Council (NSC), members 
of the Senate, and other interested officials,” containing Arbenz’s “library of Marxist 
literature, Chinese Communist materials on agrarian reform, pages from Mrs. Arbenz’s 
copy of Stalin’s biography, evidence that Arbenz had tried to purchase arms from Italy, 
and various letters and cables revealing a ‘strong pro-communist bias,’” all of which 
Cullather argues as, “sufficient to impress the NSC staff.”302 Cullather also points out 
that the captured arms from the Alfhem were reported to have been “obsolete and in poor 
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conditions,” and that they “could be easily traced” back to their origin; however, CIA 
Director Allen Dulles “declined the offer” for further investigation.303 
Washington focused on ensuring the roundup of communists who had fled during 
the coup, seizing on the opportunity to identify them as a threat if they tried to organize 
their return to Guatemala, and as an opportunity to smear Moscow by offering them up as 
asylum seekers and proof of a Soviet hand in Guatemalan politics. The idea was that 
Moscow would lose either way, through confirming their complicity if they accepted 
them or having sold them out if they refused to give the conspirators asylum.304 
Nonetheless, what actually followed in Guatemala was a roundup of thousands of 
peasants who had been granted land under Arbenz’s reforms.305 Cullather concludes that 
the Guatemalan Army had an opportunity to crush Castillo Armas and his men at 
Chiquimula, and that had that happened, it probably would have ended the coup attempt 
outright, and that most Washington officials had expected it to fail.306 Just when they 
expected that Castillo Armas’ small band of liberators was going to be destroyed by the 
Guatemalan Army at Chiquimula, in what seemed “curious and magical” to CIA 
observers in Miami and Washington, Arbenz’s government collapsed.307 To the 
observers, as Cullather argues, it seemed that Arbenz had lost his nerve, when in fact, a 
military coup had been orchestrated to overthrow him.308 During the president’s brief on 
the operation, the misinterpretation of the circumstances led Eisenhower to react in 
astonishment when he heard Castillo Armas had lost “only one” of his men.309 Cullather 
concludes that this misinterpretation of the events obscures the actual “chronic lapses in 
security, the failure to plan beyond the operation’s first stages, the Agency’s poor 
understanding of the intentions of the Army, the PGT, and the government, the hopeless 
weakness of Castillo Arma’s troops, and the failure to make provisions for the possibility 
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of defeat,” that plagued operation PBSUCCESS, despite Washington championing it as a 
resounding success.310 
The United States received a considerable degree of backlash for its suspected 
role in the overthrow of Arbenz. Cullather points out that the UN Secretary General at the 
time, Dag Hammarskjold, “charged that ‘the United States’ attitude was completely at 
variance with the [UN] Charter,’” and that British officials saw the “gloating remarks” of 
John Foster Dulles as evidence that PBSUCCESS was an “outside job.”311 Even more 
damaging was the view of the coup by Latin Americans, as it resulted in anti-American 
demonstrations in Havana, Santiago, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro, and 
propaganda for the communist cause. Cullather concluded that the Guatemalan attempt to 
cast off its feudal yoke became an example of the type of armed conflict that would be 
required to do so and ended any “illusions about peaceful, legal, and reformist methods” 
of social change.312  
Once in power, Castillo Armas ran down Guatemala’s foreign reserves from 
$42 million to $3.4 million during his first two months, and as opposition against him and 
his policies grew, so too did his crackdowns against that opposition, ultimately rolling 
back many of the freedoms that Guatemalans had come to enjoy and expect since 
Arevalo’s reforms in 1945.313 Castillo Armas’ regime backed by Washington 
immediately took advantage of the opposition and labeled those groups as communist 
collaborators, but given the perspective of hindsight, it seems it would have been difficult 
for the opposition groups to have made any other choice at that point. The United States 
had demonstrated its position to Guatemala and the rest of the Americas. It had rejected 
supporting the reforms sought after by Guatemalans, and instead chose to support its 
economic interests in the region, and made communism out to be the existential threat 
within not just Guatemala, but the entirety of the Americas. The United States chose to 
violate its agreements to not act unilaterally to fight communism in the hemisphere, and 
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did so in a covert manner that the whole world seems to have been well aware of, even at 
the time. Washington officials also misjudged their ability to make a client state out of 
Guatemala by failing to control and temper Castillo Armas’ extreme rightist tendencies. 
Armas ultimately proved to serve his own domestic political interests first.314  
I. THE GUATEMALA–CUBA CONNECTION 
In Andrew Sinclair’s biography of Ernesto “Che” Guevara, he opens with the 
revolutionaries “autobiographical synthesis: “I was born in Argentina, I fought in Cuba, 
and I began to be a revolutionary in Guatemala.’”315 The Argentinian had initially set out 
to become a doctor, but his experiences watching a failed Indian uprising in Bolivia, 
combined with his journey across the continent to view its injustices, peaked his curiosity 
at revolutionary social reform in Latin America. Sinclair states that Guevara “seemed to 
feel responsible for all the world’s injustices,” and that he felt called to Guatemala in 
1953 to observe the revolutionary land reforms being undertaken by Arbenz at the 
time.316 While he was there he witnessed, and according to Sinclair, was involved in 
trying to organize resistance in Guatemala City to put down the U.S. intervention.317 
Regardless, Guevara left for Mexico, became fully radicalized in the Marxist-Leninist 
movement, and met Fidel Castro, himself in exile in Mexico, in the summer of 1955.318 
Castro wrote of Guevara’s experiences in Guatemala as having inspired the man to a 
“profound spirit of hatred and loathing for imperialism.”319 The unfortunate thing about 
the use of violence, even violence legitimized by the state, is that it tends to set off a 
chain reaction of consequences. Prior to the invasion of Guatemala, Eisenhower had 
called in key members associated with the coup and told them, “I want all of you to be 
damn good and sure you succeed . . . When you commit the flag, you commit it to 
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win.”320 The president then stated, “I’m prepared to take any steps that are necessary to 
see that it succeeds, for if it succeeds, it’s the people of Guatemala throwing off the yoke 
of Communism. If it fails, the flag of the United States has failed.”321 The operation in 
Guatemala, while perceived as a win for the Eisenhower administration, was not due to 
the overall design of the operation itself, but nonetheless provided the additional 
increasing returns and confirmation that Washington had an effective tool for shaping 
favorable regime changes in troublesome states.  
J. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The 1954 coup in Guatemala resulted from the collision of U.S. economic 
interests in Guatemala and fears incited by the early days of the Cold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of the global economic model. 
Guatemala’s rising nationalism mixed with a desire for social change was interpreted by 
policymakers in the United States as evidence of a communist insurrection seeking entry 
into the Americas. Despite the intentions that lay behind the justification for orchestrating 
covert interventions to shape the internal politics of another state, as occurred in 
Guatemala in 1954, it seems that these types of interventions produced subsequent 
outcomes that were largely out of control of the interveners. Fear of communist 
encroachment in the hemisphere and domestic ties to commercial interests in Guatemala 
provided opportunities for a number of actors to perceive the ends as justification for the 
interventions, but also provided motivations for actors such as Castillo Armas and 
Guatemala’s elite land holding class to manipulate the threat of communism to their own 
individual ends.  
The writings of Polanyi, in his work The Great Transformation, offer another 
perspective on the history of the political economy that also seems applicable to the 
forces that shaped global policy during the Cold War. Rather than seeing the struggle 
between each side as either a purely capitalistic or communistic form of economy that 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx may have envisioned, Polanyi argued that the reality of the 
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political economy is more of a “double movement: the extension of the market 
organization in respect to genuine commodities accompanied by its restriction in respect 
to fictitious ones.”322 What Polanyi assessed was that both politics and the economy are 
the outcomes of the rebalancing of social preferences, and that the forces that lay behind 
capitalistic and communistic outcomes in their purest senses would probably lead to the 
destruction of society if it were not for that “double-movement” and the persistent 
“counter-moves” that occur within society to balance out social preferences with societal 
needs. What was going on domestically in Guatemala was arguably less about capitalism 
or communism, and more akin to Polanyi’s “double-movement.” The rising economic 
nationalism that Washington saw as a threat was actually certain factions within 
Guatemalan society attempting to balance societal needs that had already occurred in 
Europe and the United States through social movements during the Industrial 
Revolutions. Through a violent, though democratic movement, Guatemala was trying to 
break from its structural legacy of colonialism. The problem presented by the external 
intervention conducted by the United States is that it inadvertently interrupted this natural 
domestic movement for social reform, perhaps even tilting it in the direction it was 
already headed. Still, it does appear that domestic actors within Guatemala were using the 
Cold War rhetoric to manipulate Washington’s response to meet their own domestic 
political objectives. Regardless, the operation seemed to work flawlessly for Washington, 
and they had a twice proven tool for exerting plausibly deniable coercive pressure to 
shape domestic politics within other countries.  
The perception of success in Iran and Guatemala reaffirmed Washington’s policy 
stance during the early years of the Cold War, and confirmed its most cost effective 
manner of dealing with regime’s with communist tendencies. The behavioral lock-in 
appears confirmed with the Guatemala intervention’s hailed success. The evidence, 
however, suggests that the operation did not end in disaster save only for several key 
moments of luck, particularly in regard to Armas’ small force that by all rights should 
have been defeated by the Guatemalan army at Chiquimula. Nonetheless, the operation 
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worked, and provided the increasing returns that all but ensured that Washington would 
allow itself to be carried into the Bay of Pigs debacle as the U.S. response to the Cuban 
Revolution. The threat of communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere provided a 
strong ideological motivation and justification for restructuring Guatemalan domestic 
politics to conform to the Eisenhower administration’s interpretation of American 
exceptionalism. Yet, despite being immediately successful in removing Arbenz, 
Guatemala has since traced a long history of domestic instability. While Guatemala’s 
instability cannot be entirely accounted for due to the 1954 intervention, defeating 
communism at any cost eroded U.S. legitimacy in the Western Hemisphere and polarized 
domestic politics in the region. The escalation of an adversarial environment also made 
applying the communist label to opposition groups politically salient, as it drew the 
attention of U.S. power and resources, and conversely Soviet power and resources. 
Hindsight, provides the perspective required to recognize that the benefits of the 
interventionist policies in Iran and Guatemala fail to outweigh their costs. The perception 
of success in these interventions made the method seem to be the appropriate solution for 
the problems that emerged in Cuba in 1959. 
The U.S. reaction to the Cuban Revolution and the timing of the decision to 
remove Castro from power is critical to understanding the failure at the Bay of Pigs. In 
the following chapter, I argue that the U.S. reaction to the Cuban Revolution, Castro’s 
intolerable anti-American rhetoric, and flirtations with the Soviet Union convinced the 
Eisenhower administration that the proven method of intervention would deal with Fidel 
Castro and the communist threat to Cuba as it had with Mosaddegh and Arbenz. The 
perceived successes in Iran and Guatemala convinced the incoming Kennedy 
administration that the method would work. Guatemala built on the pattern of increasing 
returns established from success in Iran and fueled the U.S. justification to orchestrate a 
similar, though larger, version of operation PBSUCCESS in Cuba, and its public failure 
did significant damage to U.S. legitimacy in the Western Hemisphere.  
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IV. CUBA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The interventions in Iran and Guatemala followed a path carved by the 
institutional constructs of early policy development during the Cold War and guided 
planners decisions in planning the intervention in Cuba in April 1961. While the 
justifications for these interventions are multifaceted, the locus of motivation centered on 
U.S. perceptions of communist penetration into these states’ domestic politics. Time 
provides perspective on the exaggerated nature of that penetration and a better 
understanding of the social forces at work that underlay the perceived threat. Analysis of 
the intervention is significant because the U.S. response to the Cuban Revolution marks a 
critical juncture, not only for U.S.-Cuban relations, but hemispherical interstate relations 
as a whole during the Cold War. Erosion of U.S. hemispheric legitimacy and the 
degradation of U.S.-Latin American relations followed for decades and continues to 
persist today. We develop laws, rules, and policies—our institutions—as a way to shape 
human behavior and guide our social interactions down a path of order, progress, in an 
attempt to provide domestic political stability. Yet there exist circumstances where the 
paths carved by those institutions yield unintended, and often destabilizing consequences. 
In this section, I argue that the path carved by Cold War institutional constructs mutated 
into a pathological course that contributed to the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and 
ultimately escalated U.S.-Soviet tensions to the nuclear standoff that followed. Cold War 
institutional constructs, in many ways driven by U.S. and Soviet reactions to the Cuban 
Revolution, and the perceived successes of U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala, 
provided a structural apparatus that guided individual policy makers—U.S., Cuban, and 
Soviet—in their actions that strained U.S. hemispherical relations for decades. The events 
leading up to the Bay of Pigs failure provides some of the most compelling evidence of 
institutional pathology because it can be seen from the perspectives of Washington and 
Cuba, each succumbing to their own institutionally carved paths that drove the impetus 
for the intervention, ultimately resulting in failure for the United States and Cuba in the 
Soviet sphere of influence. 
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B. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 
In 1956, Fidel Castro landed in Cuba to lead a revolution to overthrow Fulgencio 
Batista’s regime, and just three years later, Castro led his force of 9,000 guerillas into 
Havana, seizing power from Batista. Batista himself had come to power in a 1952 
military coup, and had enjoyed considerable, though waning, support from Washington, 
in spite of the repressive nature of his regime. During the course of the events that 
unfolded after the revolution, it became increasingly clear to the Eisenhower 
administration that Castro’s regime could not be tolerated, and thus Washington 
organized a plan to discredit Castro and remove him from power. Though the 
administration initially found itself open to the transition to Castro, Washington officials 
soon became “full of trepidation about the shape of things to come” in Cuba.323 But what 
actually made Castro unacceptable as a potential leader of Cuba? The factors that lay 
behind the Eisenhower administration’s ultimate conclusion that Castro was unacceptable 
and his removal was necessary to U.S. interests helps to understand the path toward the 
failed invasion.324 The revolution’s swift show trials and executions, Castro’s persistent 
anti-American rhetoric, his land reforms and expropriations of private U.S. investments, 
and the threat to vital interests certainly contributed to the decision to remove Castro 
from power. Nevertheless, what seemed to be intolerable for the United States was 
Castro’s reckless, and seemingly naïve, flirtations with communism that directly 
challenged and threatened to unhinge vital strategic economic interests throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. 
Framing the decision to remove Castro from power within the context of global 
events surrounding and coinciding with the Cuban Revolution highlights the island’s 
significance to the Eisenhower administration. Much of the literature regarding the period 
centers on the Eisenhower administrations’ escalation of anti-communist policies and the 
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interventionist role the United States assumed to secure its economic interests throughout 
the Americas. Stephen Rabe concludes that the administration “wanted Latin Americans 
to support the United States in the Cold War, adopt free trade and investment principles, 
and oppose communism.”325 Yet, Rabe acknowledges that Eisenhower personally 
considered the U.S. assault on Castro as “a policy ‘approximating gangsterism.’”326 More 
than communism, Washington officials feared the charismatic power of an individual 
who knew how to stoke the social and economic frustrations of the masses in Cuba, 
calling for radical reform in the name of promoting progress in Cuba that also produced a 
new narrative that directly threatened the economic system of dependency between the 
United States and Latin America. Through examining the Foreign Relations of the United 
State (FRUS) documents for the period, one realizes that Washington officials could not 
voice that agenda publicly, thus strengthening U.S. anti-communist rhetoric, and feeding 
Castro’s domestic political support. 
The increase in movements of economic nationalism occurred throughout the 
Americas during the period immediately following World War II, and Cuba was no 
exception. Washington officials considered these reformist movements and communist 
connections to be a threat to the long-term economic interests of both Latin America and 
the United States, but they also often directly threatened U.S. private interests abroad. 
James Siekmeier concluded that the overall goals of these reformist movements in Latin 
America were to eliminate the persistent feudal agriculture system, integrate indigenous 
peoples into society, reduce the oligarchical stronghold, increase the middle class, and 
promote general economic diversification.327 Washington, however, saw economic 
nationalism as a threat not only to existing U.S. business interests, but that it also 
endangered the ability for foreign capital to enter the region, potentially leading to 
stagnation, and also endangering long-term economic growth in the region.328 Indeed, 
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Castro’s agrarian reform plans, and particularly the expropriation of U.S. investments in 
the sugar industry, appear to have eliminated the chance for warm relations between 
Castro and Washington.329 On the contrary, William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh 
have proposed that Washington was less troubled by the agrarian land reforms and lack 
of financial compensation for expropriated properties than the signaling of Castro’s 
radical new direction for Cuba.330 Additionally, as Kate Doyle argues, the revitalization 
of the left in Mexico in response to the Cuban Revolution weighed heavily on the minds 
of Washington officials at the time, and this fixation on the spread of communism 
throughout the hemisphere is what U.S. policymakers feared most.331 Analysis of 
diplomatic correspondence during the period suggests that expropriation without 
adequate compensation of privately held U.S. interests combined with Castro’s persistent 
and growing anti-American rhetoric and Soviet flirtations antagonized Washington to the 
point of intervening. In hindsight, it appears that this path was largely carved by both 
U.S. and Cuban perceptions regarding U.S. interventionism in response to rising 
movements of economic nationalism. The institutional pathology that emerged not only 
influenced U.S. actors, but also the Cuban response to those actions.  
C. U.S. AND CUBAN INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES CONVERGE 
During the first months of 1959, events were unfolding rapidly in Cuba, and 
Washington appeared to be reacting on the best information that it had at the time 
regarding Castro’s 26th of July revolutionary movement. In a memorandum to the 
president dated January 7, 1959, secretary of state John Foster Dulles summarized the 
initial aftermath of the revolutionary movement led by Castro, stating that order had been 
restored and Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleo had been appointed as the provisional president of 
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Cuba.332 In the memorandum Dulles expressed his belief that the new government would 
maintain order and meet Cuba’s international commitments, and that the new government 
appeared to be “free from communist taint” and would pursue friendly relations with 
United States.333 Due to the perception that the U.S. ambassador in Cuba may have 
recommended to Batista to flee the country—though apparently untrue—President 
Eisenhower suggested that a change of ambassadors would be necessary to promote 
friendly relations between the two countries.334 During Castro’s victory speech given to a 
crowd of some 40,000 Cubans, he declared that the revolution belonged to the people of 
Cuba, and that they would now have “peace without dictatorship, without crime, or 
censorship.”335 He also expressed that he would accept no ministerial position, that the 
greatest threat to the revolution were self-interested revolutionaries, and that there was no 
danger of dictatorship since the government had the support of all Cubans.336 
Washington remained concerned that Castro’s intentions were more than he was stating 
in his speeches, and in a White House special staff note that gave background 
information on Castro, dated January 13, 1959, he was described as having a 
“predilection for violence, relentlessness, and direct independent action to attain his 
ends,” but also that he was not believed to have been a communist-sympathizer.337 
 Perhaps one of the most radical and internationally condemned initial actions of 
the new regime were the summary tribunals that tried members of the Batista regime for 
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war crimes. These trials took place in a soccer stadium in front of crowds of thousands. 
They sentenced as many as 550 to death after trials lasting only a few weeks.338 Some 
figures put the Batista regime’s reign of terror as high as 20,000 Cubans killed between 
1956 and 1958.339 For this reason, many of the revolution’s supporters, who happened to 
also have been communists, were at least tolerant of the trials. The fact that the trials and 
executions were also broadcast on television certainly must have amplified the sentiments 
of both sides. A memorandum from the assistant secretary of state for inter-American 
affairs to Dulles stated that the executions were seen unfavorably across Latin America, 
and that most of the support in favor of them came from elements of the communist 
aligned press.340 The growing concern for the potential communist exploitation of the 
anti-American sentiments of the revolution were expressed in a letter from the consul at 
Santiago de Cuba to the deputy director of the office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs. 
In the letter, Park F. Wollam expressed his concerns that the United States was taking on 
an unwarranted amount of blame for atrocities committed by the Batista regime that was 
hidden from the Cuban people under that regime’s censorship.341 
In a January 20, 1959 meeting between the counselor of the embassy in Cuba and 
the minister of state for Cuba, the Cubans charged three complaints against the U.S. 
mission in Cuba. These objections included Ambassador Smith’s relationship with 
Batista, the American press, and U.S. military missions in Cuba, but the Cuban diplomat 
stated his government’s pleasure with the appointment of Philip Bonsal to ambassador, a 
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career officer fluent in Spanish who had recently been the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia.342 
The Cuban response to the international condemnation of the trials was an invitation 
extended to Congressmen Adam Clayton Powell and Charles O. Porter to witness the 
revolution’s war crimes trials firsthand, which they accepted and attended a rally of some 
500,000 Cubans on January 21, 1959, and listened to a speech given by Castro for nearly 
five hours. During the speech Castro called on the crowd for a show of solidarity and 
approval of the executions of Batista’s “assassins” to which the crowd responded with 
raised hands and a “vengeful roar.”343 Castro then challenged the condemnations by 
contrasting the scale of the trials with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and the deaths justified in the name of peace for those causes.344 Castro’s rhetoric 
resonated domestically with the grievances held by many Cubans, and aided his 
consolidation of power, but it brought concern to Washington.  
The influence of communism weighed most heavily on the minds of Washington 
officials, yet they seemed to have been consistently assured that Castro was not leading 
Cuba toward communism. A January 27, 1959, letter the U.S. ambassador in Costa Rica 
summarizes a conversation with the former president of Costa Rica, Jose Figueres Ferrer, 
in which they discussed the future of Cuba under Castro. Figueres expressed his opinion 
that Cuba was likely to go in the direction of another Latin American dictatorship, but not 
in the direction of communism.345 The ambassador then said to Figueres that he felt that, 
since the Cuban Revolution was successful in spite of the arms given to the Batista 
regime, the notion that dictators had been propped up by arms from the United States no 
longer held true, and that it was inaction on the part of the people that kept dictators in 
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power.346 The ambassador stated that the reason for furnishing arms to dictators was to 
“avoid a vacuum into which the Iron Curtain countries might move.”347 The vacuum in 
Cuba that concerned both the ambassador and Figueres was one that existed in the labor 
field, and at the time, was being exploited by the communists.348 Apparently, up until 
that time, Castro’s 26th of July movement had remained somewhat ignorant of communist 
intentions in Cuba.349 
Despite Castro’s boisterous rhetoric and frequent public speeches, he did retreat 
temporarily from the public view in late January after a visit to Venezuela. During that 
visit he had called for solidarity among Latin Americans, particularly among the 
Caribbean nations, and continued his anti-American speeches, stating that there was a 
campaign within the monopolistic American news corps to slander him and the 
revolution.350 What concerned Washington was the “wild acclaim” that he received 
during his visit to Venezuela.351 Additionally, alarming to Washington officials were 
assessments given by the Cuban exile leader, Dr. Carlos Piad in a conversation with the 
counselor for the American Embassy in Cuba Daniel Braddock, stated that the 
communists in Cuba were increasing their activity by selling communist “bonds” in the 
capital.352 Even more disturbing to him were the anti-American statements and bias of 
Castro, yet even Piad admitted that he felt that Castro was falling victim to poor 
intelligence given to him by the anti-American president of the Cuban national bank a 
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registered agent of the 26th of July movement in the United States.353 Piad felt that Castro 
would benefit from a visit to the United States.354 Castro continued his anti-American 
rhetoric in a speech given at Guantanamo on February 3, 1959, accusing U.S. 
ambassadors of being responsible agents for “Cuba’s perennial economic troubles.”355 
Braddock, however, believed that Castro was using the anti-American rhetoric to trump 
up his domestic support from the “uniformed masses,” and that a cordial visit to the 
United States might help “dispel much of his suspicion and prejudice” toward the United 
States.356 
Washington’s concerns for Castro’s lack of attention given to the domestic 
situation is expressed in a briefing memorandum by the assistant secretary of state for 
inter-American affairs special assistant, dated February 6, 1959, which emphasized that 
in the six weeks since Batista’s absence, little progress toward stabilizing and organizing 
a new government had been made, and that Castro appeared preoccupied with giving 
triumphant victory speeches and consolidating government positions with members of the 
26th of July movement than being accessible to construct a functioning government with 
President Urrutia.357 Similar concerns regarding the communist Ernesto “Che” Guevara 
and his plans to spread the revolution to Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
Paraguay, combined with the acknowledgement that the technically illegal Communist 
Party was now operating in the open in Cuba.358 Despite these concerns, U.S. objectives 
in Cuba focused on “strengthening the moderating and stabilizing influences on Castro 
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and the Cuban government,” with the understanding that this would have to be 
approached delicately to successfully negotiate the atmosphere of anti-Americanism 
developing in Cuba.359  
On February 14, 1959, the U.S. embassy in Cuba telegrammed the Department of 
State that the prime minister of Cuba had resigned and that Castro would assume the role 
of prime minister with increased power to “dictate policy of government” and “dispatch 
administrative orders.”360 Castro then became Prime Minister of Cuba two days later 
embassy cables reported that, despite Castro’s resentment of the United States, given time 
to cool off a “fully friendly relationship” could still be established between the two 
governments.361 The office of Mexican and Caribbean affairs assessment of the Cuban 
political economic environment at the time concluded that with tens of thousands of 
Cubans out of work, thousands accustomed to guerilla warfare, and many thousands more 
having gone without university for at least the last four years, that the challenges facing 
the future leader of Cuba were significant, and potentially dangerous.362 Additionally, 
officials saw three groups emerging as contenders for the future leadership of Cuba. A 
radical communist group led by Raul Castro and “Che” Guevara, Castro’s more moderate 
revolutionary elements, and the mature moderates and government technicians that would 
seek to work for Cuba’s advantage in its future relationship with the United States.363 
The report concluded that the United States should support the mature moderates and 
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attempt to nudge Castro toward the moderates and isolate the more radical elements, but 
that publicly the United States should not appear too helpful to Castro, particularly 
financially, in light of his excessive anti-American rhetoric for fear of how other more 
pro-American countries might react to such assistance.364 
These cautions came about at the same time as the realization that an estimated 
$60 million in state coffers had been emptied by the fleeing Batista regime which 
seriously threatened the stability of the Cuban peso.365 Weighing heavily on the minds of 
Washington officials was the potential for significant social unrest if the Cuban peso 
were to seriously devalue, which could lead to violence and put at stake the $800 million 
in U.S. private investments on the island.366 Castro was still an enigma at this point, and 
officials could not tell if he was supportive of democracy, communism, or dictatorship, 
and his actions did not appear to be leading the country in a direction of order and 
stability. By March 9, 1959, Castro had accepted an invitation from the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors to visit the United States in April 1959, and Ambassador Bonsal 
was committed to encouraging the best possible relations between the United States and 
Cuba.367 
Just five weeks after Castro had been appointed to prime minister, during the 
400th meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1959, Allen Dulles, director 
of the CIA, expressed his concerns over Castro’s gravitation toward dictatorial rule 
founded in demagoguery, and the permissive environment for communist infiltration that 
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was developing in Cuba.368 The primary subject of discussion during this meeting 
concerned how Washington would handle Castro’s planned visit to the United States. 
Officials were particularly agitated by Castro’s inflammatory rhetoric that U.S. 
imperialism was the biggest threat to Cubans, and they discussed options of denying a 
visa for his visit, or whether economic pressures placed on the Cuban sugar industry 
might persuade Castro to tone down his anti-imperialist language.369 President 
Eisenhower, however, expressed concerns that such a move would likely meet with 
Soviet offers to purchase Cuban sugar.370 The meeting concluded with remarks from the 
president that the “slow-growing movement against Castro in Cuba” should not be 
discouraged from growing in anyway.371 Castro’s visit to the United States had been 
scheduled for a two week period at the same time as a leave of absence planned for the 
president, so it was arranged that Castro would meet with Vice President Richard Nixon 
during his tour instead.372 
Prior to Castro’s visit, in a memorandum from the president of the Cuban national 
bank, the economic troubles that Cuba faced were laid out in planned discussion points 
that could be addressed during the prime minister’s visit. The points of discussion 
included: (1) a balance of payments program to alleviate unemployment; (2) credit to 
finance projects; (3) a long-term loan for the Agriculture and Industrial development 
banks; and (4) loans for sanitation and agricultural productivity projects.373 In 
preparation for Castro’s visit to the United States, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 
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distributed an internal memorandum emphasizing that official responses to Castro’s 
statements would need to be “reasoned, moderate, and should show . . . comprehension 
and understanding of the Cuban revolution, but they should also be firmly in defense of 
what we consider to be right.”374 During the same week, the U.S. Embassy in Cuba also 
reported that significant numbers of anti-Batista, yet pro-revolutionary, Cubans had 
approached the embassy stating that they were concerned with the communist penetration 
of government and unfriendly attitude of Castro toward the United States, and they were 
equally concerned with the unsound handling of the economy which was reaching critical 
levels.375 These Cubans feared that economic assistance given to Castro’s regime while 
making such bold anti-American statements would make the United States “lose further 
prestige internationally.”376 Apparently in Washington, officials remained unaware that 
Castro would be requesting any assistance, but they had not made a determination either 
way nor had they prepared any position papers on the topic.377 
In a pre-trip meeting held between Ambassador Bonsal and Castro, the prime 
minister made several noteworthy comments that Bonsal cabled back to the United 
States. First was Castro’s annoyance with what he felt were misleading reports in the 
U.S. media, stating that the media in the United States had the “freedom to lie.”378 
Second, Bonsal noted that Castro seemed cynical about the “goodness of man,” and third, 
Castro felt that the success of U.S. democracy was attributed more to “education of the 
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people rather than U.S. political forms.”379 Castro’s wide popularity, communist efforts 
to consolidate their positions in government, and the sensitivity of anti-American 
sentiment in Cuba concerned Bonsal in his reports, yet he also noted a growing anti-
Castro and certainly anti-communist sentiment, which he called the “bourgeois 
mentality.”380 Bonsal felt that any U.S. condemnation of Castro would be taken by the 
majority of Cubans as an assault on the Cuban revolution itself.381 The ambassador 
concluded that the United States “should give the Cubans themselves as much 
opportunity as possible to straighten themselves and Castro out before unlimbering our 
artillery against Castro.”382  
The growth of the communist movement in Cuba was expressed in a report to the 
State Department in a lengthy dispatch from the embassy on the April 14, 1959. The 
report highlights the degree of infiltration within the Cuban armed forces, government, 
labor movement, media, and cultural realm, and the reasons for its success.383 By not 
supporting the Batista regime during the revolution, the party earned the right to exist in 
public again and were ready and organized to move when the opportunity arose.384 
Castro’s radical reform programs and anti-Americanism also met with the party’s overall 
objectives.385 The report recommended that the United States remain openly supportive 
of Castro and the revolution, but to also promote an “unyielding attitude toward 
communism,” since the objective of the communists was to “drive a wedge between the 
revolution and the United States.”386 Despite the doubts that the assistant secretary of 
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state for inter-American affairs, Roy Rubottom, had for both the “character and 
motivation of Prime Minister Castro,” he did agree with the embassy’s conclusion that 
the United States should hear Castro out and attempt to guide him away from leading his 
country into a “position of nationalistic neutralism.”387 As for U.S. economic assistance, 
it was suggested that such loans be dependent on a satisfactory stabilization agreement 
arranged through the International Monetary Fund (IMF).388 
The Department of State concluded that Castro’s visit to the United States was 
contrived, and that Castro had been on his best behavior, closely advised by his 
accompanying ministers.389 The Department of State’s understanding of the post trip 
situation with Cuba was that Castro had allayed the criticism against him in the general 
press and public, that he had not made a strong enough declaration of anti-communism, 
and that his land reform plans may have been a threat to private U.S. interests in Cuba, 
including the $85 million U.S. government owned nickel plant in Nicaro.390 The 
significance of this nickel mine came up later in January 1960 during the decision to 
initiate active covert action against Cuba, and President Eisenhower felt the nickel 
deposits to perhaps be sufficient enough reason to possibly blockade Cuban nickel from 
                                                 
387 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Acting 
Secretary of State, April 15, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 280. Accessed February 23, 2016. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d280. 
388 Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 281. Accessed February 23, 2016. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d281. 
389 Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, April 23, 1959, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1958–1960, vol. 6, Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), doc. 292. Accessed 
February 23, 2016. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d292. 
390 Ibid.; Peter Ostendorp, “Nickel: Hidden in Plain Site,” Dartmouth Toxic Metals: Superfund 
Research Program, accessed February 27, 2016. http://www.dartmouth.edu/~toxmetal/toxic-metals/more-
metals/nickel-history.html. Ostendorp explains: “Nickel was used as a strengthening agent in many of these 
alloys. Similar needs for stress and temperature resistance prompted the use of nickel-containing alloys in 
the burgeoning space race. Rocket engines have similar engineering demands as jet engines due to the high 
temperature and pressure of exhaust gases, and they also must endure extreme vibration caused by the 
combustion of rocket fuels. The early space industry used nickel in conjunction with other high-strength 
materials like titanium to create new classes of superalloys capable of withstanding the turbulence of space 
flight.”  
 88
reaching the Soviet Union.391 The department also concluded that Castro was more 
concerned with the roaring approval of a crowd than following democratic rule of law.392 
Despite these indicators, the department still considered Castro an enigma, but a 
potentially dangerous enigma, and that his trip had likely given him “knowledge of 
American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his 
return to Cuba.”393 
D. CASTRO’S LAND REFORMS 
Following Castro’s visit to the United States, a summary of the situation in Cuba 
was transmitted to the assistant secretary of state on April 24, 1959. The report concluded 
that a stark division between the impoverished masses, who wildly supported Castro, and 
the propertied elite class who had a growing concern for the “mushrooming of 
communism” within the country.394 The Communist Party in Cuba was the only 
organized political party at the time, and it was taking advantage of this rift and would 
continue to exploit it to the party’s advantage in the months to come.395 The report 
concluded that it was necessary to prepare acceptable alternatives for either Castro’s 
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assassination, Castro endangering vital U.S. interests, or a general degeneration of the 
situation in Cuba.396 Just a few weeks after Castro’s return to Cuba, on May 17, 1959, the 
Cuban Cabinet “promulgated” the controversial Agrarian Reform Law.397 
The new law expropriated land that exceeded certain limits, and within the sugar 
industry, required that plantations must be owned and registered to Cuban 
shareholders.398 It also created cooperative farms run by the newly formed Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (INRA), which also distributed 67 acres to individuals, and limited 
future land purchase to Cubans only.399 Ambassador Bonsal pointed out that “Che” 
Guevara particularly desired the land reform program, which was opposed by the 
minister of agriculture, Sori Marin, and that the U.S. could expect that the communists 
would try to infiltrate INRA.400 Bonsal also pointed out that Cuban and American sugar 
industry’s felt that these reforms would seriously disrupt the Cuban economy, but also 
that “several other” Cuban and American sources felt the program could be beneficial in 
the long-term, and at least could withstand the transition with the seven million tons 
available to harvest.401 Nonetheless, the reform initiated a firestorm of debate from both 
sides of the issue. Particularly debated was whether to extend the Sugar Act that was due 
to expire on January 1, 1961. Traditionally, the act was extended a year prior to 
expiration since the sugar crop cycle is 18 months, but Congressional debates for the 
Sugar Act were usually not heard during presidential election years.402  
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The State department desired to postpone the decision until the following year, 
pending developments with the land reforms that could threaten Cuba’s ability to meet its 
quota of U.S. sugar consumers.403 The assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, 
Thomas Mann, argued that he could not support a bill that “would assure Cuba 70% of all 
U.S. sugar imports for a period of years at a time when $800 million of U.S. investments 
in Cuba are threatened.”404 Mann also argued that the United States, “[had] investments 
totaling $9 billion in Latin America, and every country in the hemisphere [was] watching 
to see what U.S. reaction to Cuba’s expropriation will be.”405 To answer these fears, 
Castro sent a cablegram to the Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Benson that Cuba was 
prepared to “sell the United States of America 8 million tons of sugar at four cents per 
pound in 1961” and that it would not be necessary to “liberate” U.S. domestic 
production.406 This seems to have done little to quell Washington’s fears of the potential 
damage that Castro’s anti-American rhetoric and near hysterical popular support could do 
to the economic relationship between Latin America and the United States. 
On July 1, 1959, the chief of the Cuban air force, defected and fled to the United 
States in a small boat with his wife, brother, and another officer, trying to escape what he 
described as a purge of anti-communist officers.407 U.S. officials felt Diaz Lanz gave a 
unique glimpse into the inner workings of Castro’s regimes, and most troublingly, the 
spread of communists within the armed forces.408 The United States used this opportunity 
to press for the Organization of American States (OAS) to convene and pressure Castro 
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on his fascinations to launch further revolutionary expeditions in the Caribbean.409 The 
problem was that it could easily be made to seem that the United States was merely using 
Diaz Lanz to discredit Castro and intervene in Cuba.410 CIA Director Allen Dulles was 
particularly concerned with Cuban efforts to launch attacks against the Dominican 
Republic, perhaps through Haiti, and that the groups preparing to launch these attacks 
were “either communist-led or communist-infiltrated.”411 Coinciding with these events, 
Diaz Lanz appeared before the U.S. Senate Committee, inciting a furiously anti-
American speech by Castro, proclaiming the imperative need for the agrarian reforms, the 
hypocrisy of the OAS calling a meeting against him [Castro] and not against Batista, and 
stating that no country has the right to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs.412  
On July 17th, 1959, Castro resigned, brutally denounced President Urrutia leading 
to his resignation as well, and then, in less than 24 hours, Castro resumed the position of 
prime minister.413 Bonsal pointed out at this time that despite taking the position of non-
persecution of communists, Castro had taken on an “almost pathological resentment at 
any implications of communism in government, which he referred to repeatedly as efforts 
to ‘blackmail’ him and as infamous calumny.”414 For the next month and a half, the 
relationship between Castro and the United States became increasingly distrustful of one 
another until a September 3, 1959 dinner between Castro and Bonsal, in which Castro 
interestingly asserted that Bonsal was being “unduly pessimistic about the state of our 
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[U.S.-Cuban] relations.”415 The discussion that night between Bonsal and Castro 
illustrates the apparent naiveté of Castro as he seemed completely taken aback by how 
seriously the United States took his permissive stance on communism, lack of fair 
compensation for the expropriated U.S. property, and the revolutionary expeditions in the 
Caribbean.416 Castro and his foreign minister, Raul Roa, had urged Bonsal that the 
United States owed Latin America aid to the scale that Africa and Asia had received after 
World War II.417 LeoGrande and Kornbluh concluded that at this point, it was too late to 
mend relations between Washington and Havana, and that the anti-American rhetoric had 
taken an irreversible toll on the domestic political front in the United States.418 These 
authors point out that on October 16, 1959, a Department of State official mistakenly 
revealed that the United States had urged Great Britain not to deliver jet aircraft that were 
purchased during Batista’s regime but still awaiting delivery, which once again infuriated 
Castro.419 Apparently, this was a familiar scheme used by Allen Dulles in an attempt to 
push Castro into purchasing arms from the Soviet Union, as it had worked in the CIA plot 
to overthrow President Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954, when that president was forced to 
purchase arms from Czechoslovakia when the United States would not sell to his 
regime.420 Schemes such as these are telling, in that the justification for intervention was 
built on attempting to create the justifiable conditions for initiating the interventions by 
the institutions that would be conducting them. 
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E. THE DECISION TO REMOVE CASTRO 
The January 14, 1960 minutes of the discussion at the 432nd meeting of the 
National Security Council (NSC) sums up the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations.421 
The assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, Roy Rubottom, explained that “the 
period from January to March [1959] might be characterized as the honeymoon period of 
the Castro Government. In April a downward trend in U.S.-Cuban relations had been 
evident, partly because of the preparation by Cuba of filibustering expeditions against the 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama.”422 He went on to say that, “In June we 
had reached the decision that it was not possible to achieve our objectives with Castro in 
power and had agreed to undertake the program referred to by Mr. Merchant.”423 
Livingston Merchant was the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and the plan he 
referred to was one that would accelerate opposition in Cuba to bring about change in the 
Cuban Government, one more favorable to U.S. interests, and under best circumstances 
would appear that Castro was responsible for his own demise.424 
The principal drivers of the breakdown in relations seems to have been Castro’s 
anti-American rhetoric, permissiveness of communists in Cuba, agrarian reforms and 
expropriations of U.S. property, and U.S. intolerance of communist infiltration into the 
Americas, even if that came in the form of economic nationalist movements seeking long 
overdue reform. In September 1959, Ambassador Bonsal also expressed to Roy 
Rubottom that “our alleged failure during the past five or six years to take a more positive 
attitude toward the problems of economic development in Latin America is responsible 
for some of the unhappy aspects of our relations with the Castro Government and with 
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other governments and groups in the hemisphere.”425 The significance of the breakdown 
of U.S.-Cuba relations during this transitional period following the Cuban Revolution is 
that it seems to have catalyzed a series of events that led to the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion, Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, and escalation of Cold War tensions that 
eventually led to the Cuban missile crisis. Perhaps most catastrophically, it polarized the 
Americas into fundamentally opposed camps on the right and left for the duration of the 
Cold War. It seems plausible that had the relationship between the Eisenhower 
administration and the Castro regime not been so polarized by mistrust and rhetoric on 
both sides, a much different course of events may have unfolded.  
F. BAY OF PIGS INVASION 
In April 1961, the U.S. orchestrated the invasion into Cuba that resulted in 
disaster. Later that year, the board of inquiry into the tactical failure of the initial invasion 
of the brigade of dissidents into Cuba placed much of the blame on “a shortage of 
ammunition resulting from poor ammunition discipline by the invading forces, the loss of 
the freighters Rio Escondido and Houston, and . . . failure to destroy Castro’s air force . . . 
due to restraints placed on the anti-Castro air force to protect the covert character of the 
operation.”426 That group of dissidents had been stood up in August 1959, as a 
paramilitary force to be used as a response to crisis situations in the Western Hemisphere, 
and Cuba had only been designated as one of the potential targets.427 The Cuban 
dissidents were primarily recruited in Florida and sent to, Fort Knox, New Orleans, and 
Guatemala for training, and in November 1960, increased considerably in size. The 
number in Guatemala increased from 644 at the end of January to 1,390 by the time of 
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the invasion in April.428 Those three months were plagued with additional problems as 
trainees arrived sporadically and frequently broke into disturbances.429 
The 1960 U.S. presidential campaign cycle also contributed to lapses in policy 
generation that adversely affected planners and likely contributed to the failure. 
Eisenhower had given a general go ahead for the operation on November 29, 1960; 
however, the upcoming change in administrations was affecting the flow of the 
operation.430 Meetings were held to brief the president on the pending operation, much of 
which places a significant emphasis on the urgency of conducting the intervention before 
Castro could further consolidate his position, thus necessitating a conventional and 
“sizable organized military force” to complete the operation.431 Kennedy approved the 
operation and the invasion went ahead on April 17, 1961, but air strikes planned to 
destroy the rest of the Cuban air force the night prior were called off at the last minute, 
before the landing force could be halted.432 The landing force met heavy resistance and 
after days of intense fighting and the inability to be resupplied with ammunition, they 
abandoned the fight and surrendered on April 19, 1961. 
Richard Bissell points out that a great deal of institutional change was 
implemented during the initial months of the new administration.433 Kennedy eliminated 
Eisenhower’s planning board that provided many of the checks and balances that aided in 
providing “oversight functions and [to] analyze prospective plans and policies,” including 
the elimination of half of the support staff for the National Security Council.434 Bissell 
also points out that within the interagency culture of the time, that when one agency had 
the action, then the other agencies left it to them to handle the action, despite any 
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reservations they may have had.435 In the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion, this meant 
that the CIA had the action, and to a certain extent kept the Joint Chiefs and the 
Department of Defense from deep investment in the project, which had grown in the last 
few months from a plausibly deniable insurgency by dissident Cubans to a full blown 
military invasion by relatively poorly trained individuals.436 The desire to maintain 
plausible deniability constrained the role that the U.S. military could play in supporting 
the invasion, and thus contributed to the tactical failure of the invasion. National Security 
Advisor McGeorge Bundy confirmed that “large-scale covert activity” may not be 
possible in a “society like ours;” and that “limitations were accepted that should have 
been avoided, and hopes were indulged that should have been sternly put aside.”437 It 
would seem that the combination of turmoil created by the handover of the presidency 
combined with a plan that grew larger than could reasonably be expected to remain 
covert had made the operation untenable from the outset.  
Stephen Kinzer highlights another important change during the planning phases of 
the intervention in Cuba, that for the first time, CIA director Allen Dulles had turned over 
the planning reigns to Richard Bissell.438 Kinzer also points out that Bissell had also ran 
the “rebel air force” during PBSUCCESS in Guatemala, and that he assembled virtually 
the same team for the Cuba operation.439 The Guatemalan operation had been dependent 
on the army’s betrayal of Arbenz. Kinzer argues that Castro understood that purging his 
army and eliminating dissent would be critical for the revolution’s success; all lessons 
Castro learned from Guevara’s Guatemalan experience in 1954.440 According to Kinzer, 
during a briefing in late December 1960 regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion, Marine 
Colonel Jack Hawkins had emphasized that without neutralizing the Cuban air force and 
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naval vessels, that the invasion would be “courting disaster.”441 If that fact was courting 
disaster, then ensuring it lay in the decision to go ahead even after its “operational 
security had been breached” through publications in the New York Times and the Miami 
Herald that identified the training bases in Guatemala.442 Eisenhower was convinced to 
go ahead with the operation, and Kennedy, according to Kinzer, was sold the operation 
by Bissell’s relentless commitment to the plan.443 Neither Kennedy, nor Bissell, could 
conclude that calling off the operation was acceptable. Kinzer argues that Kennedy would 
have faced the “disposal” problem of disbanding the 1,500 dissidents in Guatemala back 
to Miami, and Bissell would have forfeited his stake as Allen Dulles’s successor.444 
In assessing the failure, Kinzer highlights an important debate regarding 
intelligence functions that appeared in Time shortly after the disaster. “Should any 
intelligence gathering organization also have an operational responsibility? The British 
have long said no, arguing that a combination of the functions gives such an organization 
a vested operations interest in proving its intelligence correct.”445 That vested interest 
drove the justification for the operation and created the institutional pathology, built on 
the increasing returns from Iran and Guatemala, and ensured the institutional behavioral 
lock-in that occurred between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. 
Piero Gleijeses came to similar conclusions on the path toward failure in Cuba. In 
an interview with Bissell, he stated that he, “never saw a postmortem of AJAX [Iran] and, 
to the best of my knowledge, there was no postmortem of PBSUCCESS [Guatemala].”446 
Gleijeses points out that during Inspector General Kirkpatrick’s investigation into the 
Bay of Pigs, he also looked back into the Guatemala operation, concluding that “the 
Agency did a miserable job.”447 The institutional memory of the Guatemalan operation 
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that had developed was one of an “omnipresent CIA that had penetrated every nook and 
cranny of Guatemala—the army in particular.”448 Gleijeses points out that the further 
reflections on the Guatemalan operation by Richard Bissell, who concluded that the U.S. 
penetration of the Guatemalan army was limited principally to “the military attachés and 
the military missions, rather than through the CIA.”449 This is something that Castro 
understood well, as Guevara had informed him of that “precious lesson: ‘We cannot 
guarantee the Revolution before cleansing the armed forces.’”450 Yet, even Gleijeses 
concludes that this revelation had less to do with the failure at the Bay of Pigs than the 
perception of overwhelming success: “Coming in the wake of the overthrow of 
Mosaddegh, it [PBSUCCESS] strengthened confidence in the agency’s abilities and so 
contributed to the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban nemesis of Washington’s victory 
in Guatemala.”451 The institutional pathology that had developed carried decision makers 
on a path with multiple warning signs that it would likely end in catastrophe unless that 
absolute best of conditions evolved for the landing force. Even had the brigade made it 
through the insertion phase, it seems likely they would have still met considerable 
resistance from Castro’s consolidated army. 
G. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The Cuban Revolution represents another turn toward nationalist economic 
policies in Latin America. The revolution was a direct reaction to “thirty years of de jure 
U.S. rule and 25 more of de facto control” of the country.452 Siekmeier argues that 
Cubans were particularly frustrated by the sight of U.S. tourists who “gambled, drank, 
and fornicated while members of the mafia—the owners of the Havana casinos, big 
money makers for the corrupt regime of Fulgencio Batista—killed each other in the 
street.”453 The U.S. and Cuban economies were more closely linked to one another than 
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Guatemala’s, and the chief crop was sugarcane instead of bananas, “in 1958, 82.9% of 
Cuba’s foreign exchange was earned from the sale of sugar.”454 Cuba also received 
70.4% of its imports from the United States, and sent 66.9% of its exports back to the 
United States.455 The Cuban economy was actually one of the strongest on paper at the 
time in Latin America due to its uniquely close economic ties to the United States. 
However, this obscured the intense social division within the country itself. While 
average per capita income was $353, one of the highest in Latin America, the rural 
worker received only $91 per year. Fidel Castro’s 26th of July movement played off of 
those social frustrations, and his anti-American rhetoric resonated deeply in the majority 
of Cubans, especially since the Batista regime had been seen as essentially the chief of a 
corporate mafia on the island, supporting the interests of the highest bidder.456 When 
Castro marched victoriously into Havana in 1959, he quickly began consolidating his 
gains, and despite the United States’ attempt at dealing with Castro more favorably, he 
continued to push the anti-American rhetoric that had come to drive domestic politics in 
Cuba, forcing Washington’s hardline approach to dealing with him. 
Siekmeier argues that Castro’s initial summary trials of Batista’s officials, and 
their executions, combined with his Agrarian Reform in May 1959, was an “economic 
nationalist attempt to control a segment of Cuba’s economy traditionally dominated by 
foreigners,” and were similar to Arbenz’s moves in Guatemala five years earlier.457 
Castro’s fellow revolutionary, “Che” Guevara, had been in Guatemala in 1954 and 
observed the fall of Arbenz, and Siekmeier argues that Castro was careful to not make the 
same mistakes that Arbenz had made in dealing with the United States.458 The land 
reforms were particularly problematic for the United States, since U.S. private 
investments in the country totaled nearly $900 million and the concern was that the 
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reform would not adequately compensate those interests.459 Washington officials felt that 
those reforms meant that “Castro was not going to be a man with whom the United States 
could work.”460 Officials also saw this as an example of “the growing and rampant 
nationalism all over the world,” further reinforcing the institutional path that U.S. policy 
had taken.461 Siekmeier points out that at this point, communism was not even a point of 
discussion among Washington officials in their decision that Castro would be an 
unacceptable leader of Cuba, but rather the agrarian reform.462 The reforms marked the 
point at which the United States and Cuba began a steady escalation of tensions which 
“included a United States-sponsored invasion of the island, tolerance of norteamericano 
attempts to sabotage the Cuban economy, and CIA assassination attempts on Castro’s 
life.”463 Siekmeier points out that the significance of this lies in the fact that the decision 
to force Castro from power was made in July and August 1959, “before Castro’s 
connection to the Soviet Union became clear, both in reality and in the minds of 
Washington officials.464 The steady disintegration of U.S.-Cuban relations appears to 
have inadvertently pushed Castro into the Soviet sphere, only further—and perhaps 
unnecessarily—confirming the path carved out by U.S. policy. The decision to use 
regime change tactics similar to Iran and Guatemala, based largely on the perceived 
success of those interventions, seems to have greatly influenced decision makers in 
Washington as they formulated a strategy for installing more favorable leadership in 
Cuba.  
In November 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter argued to President 
Eisenhower that “the continued existence of the Castro regime would hurt the United 
States because Castro’s policies flagrantly undermined the private-foreign-capital model 
of economic development advocated by Washington.”465 The unwillingness of the United 
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States to work with the Castro regime opened the door for Soviets to do business with 
Cuba, but even after those relationships had begun, on March 10, 1960, the 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant, still did not feel 
that the Cuban government was “communist dominated.”466 Yet, just one week later, on 
March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved the CIA to plan to invade Cuba and 
overthrow Castro. Washington felt it imperative to “impress upon Latin America the 
nature and seriousness of communist penetration of Cuba.”467 Once that decision was 
made, the agency drew up plans for the operation based on Iran and Guatemala models. 
The similarity between both the Guatemalan and Cuban phenomena of economic 
nationalist movements is that they each seem to have been largely aimed at implementing 
reforms to address the social divisions within each country, and to achieve a degree of 
autonomy in their internal politics. Individual actors inside each of these countries 
competed for domestic power within their own institutional constructs, in as much as the 
United States was exerting coercive pressure to influence those outcomes through 
interventions. The policy of the United States remained determined to stop any such 
reformist movements that would significantly endanger U.S. strategic interests in the 
region, private commercial interests, but also those that threatened the greater U.S. 
hemispherical economic agenda, and to prevent Soviet influence from entering the 
region. The connection between economic nationalism and communism evolved as the 
reform situation in both Guatemala and Cuba gained traction, and thus a political 
justification was required to use U.S. coercive national power to intervene and challenge 
those reform movements. Within the countries themselves, opportunities to ally with one 
side or the other allowed for these states to achieve some degree of autonomy, at least for 
their internal political movements, especially in the case of Cuba. In the 1950s, the 
strongest U.S. political justification for intervention most certainly lay in efforts to fight 
communism around the world. Failure to distinguish between reform oriented economic 
nationalists attempting to address domestic social grievances and Soviet-backed 
communist infiltration of domestic politics, especially in the Guatemalan and Cuban 
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cases, led to the creation of policies that took on path dependent characteristics that 
carried the United States into the failure at the Bay of Pigs. The interventions in 
Guatemala and Cuba may not provide concrete evidence of a shortfall in U.S. 
understanding of internal political dynamics in these countries at the time, but the tool 
chosen by Washington speaks to an over dependence on a particular method of exerting 
coercive force to protect its interests within a weaker state. The threat to U.S. commercial 
interests did not drive Washington in its actions but it certainly contributed to the 
attention paid to Guatemalan and Cuban agrarian land reforms and the perceived lack of 
compensation to private U.S. investors.  
Much of the literature suggests that U.S. perception of Latin America’s 
connections to the Soviet Union was inflated to some degree, and that the Soviets had 
little direct involvement in Latin America until after the Cuban Revolution. In fact, 
strategic background information found in a declassified 1982 Special National 
Intelligence Estimate by the CIA concluded that: (1) the Soviets “had ties with some 
Latin American Communist parties since the 1920s, but until the 1960s they expended 
little effort to expand their influence in the hemisphere;” (2) “Castro’s alignment of Cuba 
with the USSR by 1961 marked a turning point in Soviet involvement in Latin America 
[and] handed Moscow an opportunity to establish an ideological, political, and military 
foothold in the hemisphere;” (3) in the 1960s, “[Moscow] emphasized in its policy the 
more pragmatic concerns of building diplomatic, commercial, and even military relations 
with the existing [pro-Communist] governments . . . discouraged the small orthodox 
Communist parties from engaging in violence and were reluctant to support leftist groups 
advocating revolution;” and (4) “this measured approach by the Soviets yielded both 
political and economic benefits,” expanded Moscow’s relations with regional states, and 
increased Soviet imports tenfold during the 1970s.468 This analysis speaks volumes to the 
implications of the course that U.S. policy carved out for relations with Latin America 
and subsequent efforts to counter Soviet influence in the region. That estimate was in 
response to Soviet encouragement of “unrest in various Central American states, gaining 
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a foothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the governments of the more 
important South American countries” in the early 1980s.469 The path taken at the end of 
World War II continued to pave the course of U.S. interventions in Latin America well 
into the 1980s.  
The consequences of the failed intervention in Cuba were the polarization of 
relations in the Western Hemisphere and erosion of U.S. legitimacy, both at home and 
abroad. The failure also had the negative effect of empowering Castro’s legitimacy in his 
campaign of anti-imperialism, which only served to escalate the adversarial environment 
in the hemisphere and necessitate more U.S. interventions. The effect at home culminated 
in the 1975 Senate probe into the intelligence community’s actions, which Loch K. 
Johnson argues contributed to the adversarial relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches that became so pronounced under the Ronald Reagan 
administration.470 The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist threat, 
however, seems to have confirmed the notion of American exceptionalism, at least in the 
ideological perceptions of some senior officials. In the concluding section that follows, I 
argue that a similar version of institutional path dependence emerged in the years 
following the end of the Cold War, which found its catalyst in the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and drove the justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ideology 
founded in American exceptionalism promoted a new pattern of increasing returns and a 
new overt institutional pathology drove the justification for war in Iraq, similar to the 
pattern that developed in the Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba interventions. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES AND 
THE 2003 U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of distinct differences between the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq 
and the previous interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba. Foremost, the previous 
three were covert interventions not subject to public discourse prior to their execution. 
Additionally, the Iraq invasion was a full scale military operation conducted by a 
coalition of nations. Yet, at the institutional level there are sufficient similarities that 
warrant comparison. The purpose of this thesis is to identify whether institutional factors 
took on path dependent characteristics that significantly determined the actions of 
policymakers through process tracing and analysis of events that led up to the Bay of Pigs 
failure, and to compare those institutional factors to the process that led to the Bush 
administration’s justification for invading Iraq. Since much of the evidence to support 
this comparison will likely remain classified for decades to come, this portion of the 
thesis is inherently somewhat speculative. Yet, the obvious paths carved by institutions in 
determining the course the United States would take in regard to Iraq is evident in the 
publicly available information on the Iraq invasion. This concluding section argues that 
such a process did emerge in the Bush administration’s efforts to justify the intervention 
to remove Saddam Hussein from power. As in the previous interventions, the tools used 
to justify the invasion involved the political opportunity structure created by the 
environment of fear within the American public following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, and highlights the power that institutional constructs have in determining the 
actions of nations beyond covert operations conducted in the shadows to full scale war 
openly harnessing citizen political will by manipulating mass enmity and threat 
perceptions. 
B. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION FOR INVADING IRAQ 
The public justification for the 2003 intervention in Iraq centered on Saddam 
Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, 
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biological, and nuclear materials that posed a danger to national security if they were to 
fall into the hands of terrorist organizations targeting the United States. This, however, 
was only the most agreed upon justification that was used in arguing the case before the 
United Nations Security Council of the many competing reasons argued between 
Washington decision makers.471 James P. Pfiffner argues that additional reasons included 
idealistic goals of ridding Iraqis of a tyrant, installing democratic governance, and the 
geo-strategic reconstruction of the Middle East.472 More telling than the nature of the 
justification is understanding when the planning for the 2003 invasion began. Thomas E. 
Ricks argues that the “formal Pentagon consideration of how to attack Iraq began in 
November 2001,” and that the timing of this decision—just after the Afghanistan 
invasion—divided the uniformed military and the office of the secretary of defense on the 
issue of whether the United States should invade Iraq and on the number of troops that 
would be used to do so.473 Ricks also points out that the U.S. Central Command, led by 
General Tommy Franks considered that, through at least May of 2002, that planning 
remained a mechanism to provide options for the president.474 The next month, President 
George W. Bush gave a speech at the U.S. Military Academy centered on preemptive 
military strategy that would seek to “confront the worst threats before they emerge.”475 
Ricks argues that the new strategy marked a departure from a historical tradition of 
promoting stability to one that actually targeted stability in an attempt to create 
change.476 This largely came out of perceptions among members of the new Bush 
administration that prior stability strategies promoted by Brent Scowcroft and James 
Baker “had led to decrepit regimes, sallow economies, and growing terrorism,” and that 
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only through a restructuring the Middle East could the new administration secure the 
United States from terrorism.477 
According to David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes, this new strategy drew 
largely from products produced by a think tank known as the Project for a New American 
Century (PNAC).478 The new strategy sought to achieve hegemonic—yet benign—
American power aimed at securing its global interests through an expanded military 
capable of preemptive strikes to counter emerging threats.479 The think tank’s many 
proclamations signatories included: “Elliot Abrams, William Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick 
Cheney, Steve Forbes, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.”480 Altheide and Grimes argue that the “PNAC was very 
influential in changing U.S. foreign policy as well as promoting favorable news coverage 
about going to war with Iraq following the attacks of 9/11.”481 In the buildup for the war, 
one of the most vocal advocates was Vice President Dick Cheney, delivering “fire-and-
brimstone” speeches, and proclaiming that there was “no doubt that Saddam Hussein now 
has weapons of mass destruction.”482 Cheney was also a vocal advocate of preemptive 
strikes against threats to U.S. national security in the months leading up to the war, 
despite evidence that suggests that the WMD threat had been inflated, including retired 
Marine General Anthony Zinni, who commanded U.S. Central Command prior to Franks, 
stated that he had never seen intelligence reports that supported the extent of Bush and 
Cheney’s claims.483 There was pushback within the government in regard to the WMD 
threat from agencies that included: the International Atomic Energy Agency, CIA, 
Department of Energy, Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Air 
Force, who believed that while Iraq may “have been motivated to develop such weapons, 
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there was no evidence of their existence.”484 Altheide and Grimes argue that, “over time, 
with much repetition, the theme about Iraq’s dangerousness remained viable even when 
evidence was produced that neither point was true.”485 What Altheide and Grimes found 
to be significant is that “the lack of reporting about PNAC’s success at planning the Iraq 
War illustrates propaganda as a feature of institutionalized news sources and media 
formats,” and that “the major television networks were tightly aligned with the war 
scenario.”486 Essentially, the Bush administration was creating new institutions through 
political rhetoric and pressures exerted on government agencies and the press. 
The similarity with the institutional path carved in the Cold War covert 
interventions is that in this case, despite happening overtly, the new institutions 
developed under the Bush administration largely to meet PNAC inspired strategic 
objectives inspired “journalists’ penchant to get on the ‘war’ band wagon, not only for 
patriotic purposes, but also because that was what ‘people were interested in,’ and that is 
‘where the story was.’”487 The powerful effect PNAC influence had on U.S. institutions 
accelerated in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the environment of 
fear and anger that followed. The ability of the Bush administration to dismiss criticism 
of those institutions only further consolidated the path that the new institutions were 
carving for the invasion of Iraq. Altheide and Grimes give the example of Bush “breaking 
decades of tradition by not permitting” United Press International correspondent Helen 
Thomas from asking questions due to her criticism of the policies.488 The authors state 
that actions by the Bush administration similar to these created pressure for “journalists 
to conform and not rock the boat.”489 By channeling the patriotic enmity flowing 
throughout the country in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and by 
silencing critical dissent of the new policies, the Bush administration was able to execute 
PNAC strategic objectives.  
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The strategies and ideological world view originated with midlevel officials—
who referred to themselves as “Vulcans”—in the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush 
administrations under the direction of Paul Wolfowitz and Condoleezza Rice in the new 
George W. Bush administration.490 Vulcans sought to “transform the world and spread 
democracy,” but when necessary to do so through “muscular foreign policy, military 
might, and moral clarity,” rather than “working within the structure of international law 
and diplomacy.”491 Wolfowitz—along with Cheney and Rumsfeld—founded the PNAC 
in 1997, “to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.”492 
Wolfowitz called for Saddam’s overthrow in open letters to President Clinton starting in 
1998.493 Remaking the Middle East was a top priority for Bush administration members 
well before the attacks of September 11th; the attacks merely provided the political 
opportunity to make those plans a reality. Jean Edward Smith argues that this stemmed 
from a Hegelian hubris that is best summed up in Karl Rove’s own words from an 
interview with Ron Suskind in the summer of 2002: “We’re an empire now, and when we 
act, we create our own reality. . . . We are history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be 
left to just study what we do.”494 These ideological constructs based in moral absolutes 
chose to ignore the complex ethnic tensions that would be unleashed in the aftermath of 
Saddam’s removal. Retired General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the coalition 
during the First Gulf War, found Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz’s dismissal of 
recommendations and concerns expressed by senior professional military operational 
planners—particularly in regard to how to contain the ethnic tensions between Sunnis, 
Shiites, and Kurds during postwar occupation—to be especially troubling.495 
The influence these new institutions created by the Bush administration exerted 
on the press also placed pressure on the intelligence community to join the war’s band 
wagon. As Pfiffner argues, the intelligence community felt similar pressure from 
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Cheney’s visits to CIA headquarters “to question the CIA judgment that Iraq did not pose 
as immediate a threat as the administration was arguing it did,” which had the effect of 
creating the perception that the agency was under political pressure to “come to the 
conclusions that the administration wanted.”496 The pressure was not limited to the CIA, 
as similar pressures were felt among DIA and State Department analysts, who felt that 
their analysis was not being accurately represented.497 Where the administration found 
too much pushback, it chose to create the Office of Special Plans in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, which argued heavily on the now debunked information on 
Saddam’s WMD programs provided by the dissident Iraqi Ahmad Chalabi.498 When 
combined with the Defense Planning Board under Richard Perle, these entities provided 
the justification needed to circumvent the resistance to going to war with Iraq that was 
coming from the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by Brent 
Scowcroft, who had been George H. W. Bush’s national security advisor and opposed the 
war.499 By placing individuals who supported the administration’s cause for war into key 
influential positions, the justification behind invading Iraq met with less resistance, and 
the institutions took on pathological characteristics that carried the nation to war, despite 
considerable concern vocalized by senior leadership within the national security 
apparatus. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGY 
Despite the differences in methods—covert versus overt interventions—the 
ideological motivation of state reconstruction differs little between the Eisenhower and 
Bush administrations. Covert interventions appealed to the Eisenhower administration 
because the U.S. domestic political opportunity structure for overt interventions was low 
in the wake of World War II and the Korean War. Covert interventions offered a solution 
to continue reconstructive interventions abroad, not only to contain communist 
subversion, but to aggressively counter it. Similarly, the Bush administration was able to 
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capitalize on the U.S. domestic political opportunity structure created by the September 
11 attacks by pressuring the intelligence community to make a strong case for removing 
Saddam and creating an environment hostile to criticism by both the press and senior 
officials not on the war bandwagon. What links these interventions? The erosion of 
perceived U.S. legitimacy, both abroad and domestically. The Iran case appears most 
successful because the Shah managed to ruthlessly suppress dissent for a quarter of a 
century until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Guatemala case appeared immediately 
successful but contributed to a costly and persistent destabilization of the state. The Cuba 
case was a complete failure and isolated the United States and Cuba from one another for 
half a century. The Iraq case, though militarily successful in removing Saddam, drew the 
United States into a costly quagmire of dubious necessity.  
The power that institutional pathology has on determining the actions taken by the 
organizations that those institutions govern is evident in both the covert operations 
developed and undertaken by the Eisenhower administration, as well as the overt 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush administration. Creating the rules that will 
determine the course of nations—as well as their component government elements—is a 
strong example of human agency, as those rules will largely dictate the future decisions 
of the majority of the body governed by those institutions. Strong institutions also have 
the power of circumventing dissent, as is evident in the overt case, but even in the covert 
Cold War case, antinationalist and anticommunist policies and rhetoric drove the actions 
more so than objective analysis. In all of the cases the justification for the intervention 
developed to support a decision that appears to have been largely made well ahead of 
time. The administrations determined that Mosaddegh, Arbenz, Castro, and Hussein 
would no longer remain in power, and the case for their removal developed from there, 
justified largely by communist links under the Eisenhower administration and terrorist 
links under the Bush administration. 
Ideology played a role in shaping decisions within the Eisenhower administration 
and its tough stance on communism, and the Bush administration’s tough stance on 
terrorism, which stems from the long—and hubristic—tradition of American 
exceptionalism and the occasionally militant exportation of freedom and democracy. As 
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Toby Dodge argues, “Individuals in the White House or indeed anywhere do not react to 
neutral, ‘objective’ situations . . . Instead, the range of choices they consider to be viable 
have been shaped—limited or widened—by the analytical categories through which they 
impose meaning on the world.”500 This does not mean that humans are not rational 
actors, but rather that rational choice is inherently constrained by an individual’s own 
perceptions of the world around them. As Dodge argues, “Decision-makers are both 
empowered and constrained by the ideational categories they have inherited from within 
their own societies and through which they make sense of the world.”501 Dodge goes 
further to explain that, “Individuals do not create the analytical categories they deploy; 
they operate within societies and institutions which give priority and validity to a set of 
units of analysis that are deployed to understand the world.”502 How and why institutions 
are created will necessarily drive the behavior of individuals within those bodies until 
those institutions are altered. Institutional survival appears to be largely dependent upon 
its perceived legitimacy, as are an individual’s internalized ideological constructs. Each 
of these constructs draw political power from the perceived legitimacy of those 
institutions by the people those institutions are intended to govern. According to Dodge, 
ideological motivations largely drove the policies of de-Ba’athification that dismissed 
virtually all of Iraq’s civil servants and the dismissal of Iraqi security forces that followed 
the initial invasion of Iraq and accelerated state collapse into civil war.503 The three year 
quagmire and thousands of Iraqi and American deaths that followed also destroyed the 
U.S. domestic political legitimacy for the Bush administration’s policies that carried the 
nation into war, requiring a paradigm shift in policy that adopted a counterinsurgency 
strategy that sought to remedy the failures of the previous policies.504 The new strategy 
required a “surge” of troops that should have been deployed during the initial invasion, 
but by that time the administration had already lost much of the domestic political will 
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required to continue with the intervention for the amount of time that would be required 
to truly stabilize Iraq. 
Though the precise nature of the consequences in Iraq are considerably different 
from the aftermath of the interventions in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, the role that 
institutions—formed from an ideological construct centered on American 
exceptionalism—had in determining the negative consequences bears strong similarities. 
The Cold War interventions centered on the rhetoric of preemptively halting the spread of 
communism, particularly into the Western Hemisphere, while also suppressing economic 
nationalist movements that were perceived as threatening to strategic economic interests. 
The Eisenhower administration developed an institutional construct centered on covert 
action to meet this threat by using techniques perceived as effective instruments of 
regime change based on success in Iran and Guatemala. The perception of success in 
these operations created a confirmation bias that helped carry the new Kennedy 
administration on an institutionally driven path created by the Eisenhower 
administration’s policies. The embarrassing failure at the Bay of Pigs that followed 
resulted in a paradigmatic shift in intrahemispheric relations for the remainder of the 
Cold War, eroded the legitimacy of the United States and covert interventions, yet 
increased their necessity by emboldening both the nationalists and the communists within 
the region and increasing their ties with the Soviet Union. The Iraq case differs only in 
the fact that the policies were developed and implemented overtly rather than covertly, 
but both sought to implement an ideologically driven, interventionist foreign policy that 
sought to reconstruct the governing institutions in those nations under the pretext of 
national security facing the threat of terrorism. 
D. FUTURE CONCERNS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most useful lessons drawn from this analysis are the evidence that human 
agency exists and plays a powerful role in determining institutional construction, but also 
that agency is inherently constrained by individual world view and attachments to 
ideological constructs when those combine with threat perception. In the Cold War case 
of covert intervention under the Eisenhower administration, the secretive nature of covert 
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policy development lacked objective scrutiny, adopted confirmation biases, and took on 
path dependent characteristics that contributed to the failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. 
The overt Iraq case exhibits similar consequences, but rather than drawing from a small 
pool to create its own confirmation bias during policy development, the Bush 
administration behaved in a manner that systematically suppressed critical scrutiny of 
their policies which ensured the path dependent characteristics that carried the United 
States into an intervention built on dubious justification.505 The consequences that 
emerge when U.S. power is applied under circumstances of questionable justification has 
the undesirable effect of eroding international and domestic perceptions of U.S. 
legitimacy. The principles of joint operations spells out the importance of both actual and 
perceived legitimacy in influencing operations, going so far as to argue it to be a decisive 
factor in operational success.506 For this reason, it is of great importance that U.S. power 
projection seeks to do so only under the most legitimate of circumstances, and strives to 
maintain both actual and perceived legitimacy. Restraining the executive branch from 
unnecessary power projection is fundamental to the U.S. checks and balances system, in 
large part for the very reason of maintaining the perception of U.S. legitimacy, both at 
home and abroad, as a core national security priority. The United States is an exceptional 
country, but it is perceived as exceptional when it adheres to the values that make it an 
exceptional place for an individual to live in the world. 
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